Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1999

Carolyn Hammond Linnell v. Dennis D. Linnell :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David S. Steffensen, Richard L. King; attorneys for appellant.
Harold G. Christensen, Rodney R. Parker, Heather S. White; Snow, Christensen, and Martineau;
attorneys for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Linnell v. Linnell, No. 990861 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2371

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

I N THE UTAH C O U R T OF APPEALS
,

CAROLYN H A M M O N D LINNELL,

1" * •

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Petitioner/Appellee,
vs.

CASE N O .

990861-CA

DENNIS D. LINNELL,

Respondent/Appellant

N A T U R E OF P R O C E E D I N G :
APPEAL FROM THIRD DISTRICT
C O U R T , STATE OF U T A H , JUDGE
D A V I D S. Y O U N G P R E S I D I N G
ARGUMENT PRIORITY
RULE

Harold G. Christensen (0638)
Rodney R. Parker (4110)
Heather S. White (7674)
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah
Telephone: 521-9000
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee
Carolyn Hammond Linnell

29(b)(i5)

David W. Steffensen, P.C. (4677)
Richard L. King, P.C. (4611)
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 485-1818
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant
Dennis D. Linnell

FILED
RESPONDENT/APPELLANT
rrp Qq
REQUESTS O R A L A R G U M E N T AND A PUBLISHED O P I N I O N

2000

COURT OF APPEALS

I N T H E I I 1 AI I ( i )UR I < H APPEALS

C A R O L Y N H A M MO

T

T

^

APIT

JNET. T

r f,ANT'S BiwLi

Petitioner, Appellee
CA ,E

vs.
DENNIS D. LINNELL,

NAT:.

Respondent/Appellant

:

Rh o i; P R o *-

LL

A;'PhA .

FROM T H I R D

I.OUK:

S T A T E OF U T \ H ,

:

\Wi;

c

v

'^-vr

DI x rT:

DISTRICT
[UDGH

PR-S'DING

A R G U M E N T P K : C ^: : Y
R u i F .1 v, f b ) 11

Harold G. Christensen (0638) ;
Rodney R.Parker (4110)
Heather S. White (7674)
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place., ] 1th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah
Telephone: 521-9000
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee
Carolyn Hammond Linnell

•

David W. Steffensen, PAJ. i 4o, .";
Richard L. King, P.C (46: M
21?^ South 700 East. Suite i'V
sak Lake City, Utah 841 71
telephone: (801) 485-1818
Attorne) _• lor Respondent/Appellant
Dennis D. Linnell

RESPONDENT/APPFLLA.
R E Q U E S T S O R A L AR*;rv,nNT ^ . ^ • P<-

;^HED O P I N I O N

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

4

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

4

STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW

6

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

8

STATEMENT OF CASE

8

STATEMENT OF FACTS

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

29

ARGUMENT

31

1. Judge Young's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell for the purpose of
calculating alimony and child support obligations was clearly erroneous and an
abuse of discretion
31
1.1.
Under Utah law, the District Court can only impute income to a person
who is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed for the purpose of reducing
child support or alimony obligations
31
1.2.
The District Court's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell is clearly
erroneous and an abuse of discretion because Mr. Linnell is not voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed for the purpose of reducing his child support
or alimony obligations
32

2. Judge Young's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell in t he amount of
$40,000.00 is clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion
35

3.

Judge Young's calculation of Mr. Linnell's alimony obligation constitutes an

2

abuse of discretion and is clearly erroneous

37

3.1. Judge Young's finding regarding alimony is deficient as a matter of law

37

3.2. Judge Young's calculation of Mr. Linnell's alimony obligation is clearly
erroneous and an abuse of discretion because Judge Young failed to consider: a)
the Appellee's ability to produce income for herself, and b) Mr. Linnell's ability to
provide the support
38

4. Judge Young's award of the parties' house to the Appellee was an abuse of
discretion and was clearly erroneous
40
5. Judge Young's division of the marital property was clearly erroneous and
constituted an abuse of discretion
42

CONCLUSION

44

3

TABLE OF A U T H O R I T I E S
Cases

Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 547 (Utah App. 1993)

39,40

Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257,259 (Utah App. 1993)

36, 38

Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,1172 & n. 10 (Utah App. 1990)
Cummings. v. Cummings, 821 P.2d472,476 (Utah App. 1991)

40
35,36,38

David K. Mast v. Brent Overson, No. 971586-CA (Utah App. Dec. 31,1998.) ....5,6,7
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218,122 -23 (Utah 1980)

42

Hallv. Hall, 858 P.2d, 1018,1022 (Utah App. 1993)

40

Hillv. Hill, 869 P.2d 963,965 (Utah App. 1994)

31

Jejfs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1242 (Utah 1998), cert, denied, 119 S. Ct. 1803 (1999)
36,37
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985)

38

Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985)

40

Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050,1052 (Utah App. 1987)

42

Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855, P.2d 260,262 (Utah App. 1993)

42

Rehn v. Rehn

36, 37

Ruckerv. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336,1338 (Utah 1979)

36, 38

Schindlerv. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84,90 (Utah App. 1989)
Shepard v. Shepard, 876 P.2d 429,432 (Utah App. 1994)
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421,425 (Utah 1991)
Thomas v. Thomas, 375 Utah Adv. Rep. 23,25 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)
4

38
42
5, 6,7
40

Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226,230 (Utah 1997)

36,37

Williamson v. Williamson, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 45,46 (Utah App. 1999)

36,37

Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338,342 (Utah 1999)

37

Statutes
Utah Code §30-3-5(7)(a)

38

Utah Code §78-2-2 (1996)

5

Utah Code §78-45-7.5 (1998)

31

Constitutional Provisions
Article VIII, §3 of the Constitution of the State of Utah

5

5

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code §78-2-2 (1996) and
Article VIII, §3 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did Judge Young commit reversible error by imputing income to Mr. Linnell
for the purpose of calculating alimony and child support obligations? This
Court reviews the legal issues raised by Judge Young's decision for correctness,
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991), and reviews Judge Young's
factual error for abuse of discretion. David K. Mast v. Brent Overson, No.
971586-CA (Utah App. Dec. 31, 1998.). This issue was preserved in the trial
court in Respondent/Appellant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
and Objection to Form of Proposed Divorce Decree (Index No. 81), ffIB 2-6,
16-19, IC 1-15.

2.

If Judge Young did not err when he imputed income to Mr. Linnell, did Judge
Young commit reversible error in calculating the amount of income that he
imputed to Mr. Linnell? This Court reviews the legal issues raised by Judge
Young's decision for correctness, State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah
1991), and reviews Judge Young's factual error for abuse of discretion. David
K. Mast v. Brent Overson, No. 971586-CA (Utah App. Dec. 31, 1998.). This issue was preserved in the trial court in Respondent/Appellant's Memorandum

6

of Points and Authorities in Support of Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, and Objection to Form of Proposed Divorce Decree
(Index No. 81), JJIB 2-6,16-19, IC 1-15.
Did Judge Young commit reversible error in awarding the Appellee alimony of
$1,100.00 per month? This Court reviews the legal issues raised by Judge
Young's decision for correctness, State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah
1991), and reviews Judge Young's factual error for abuse of discretion. David
K. Mast v. Brent Oversow No. 971586-CA (Utah App. Dec. 31, 1998.). This issue was preserved in the trial court in Respondent/Appellants Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, and Objection to Form of Proposed Divorce Decree
(IndexNo.81),fIB28.
Did Judge Young commit reversible error by awarding the parties' $380,000.00
home to the Appellee rather than ordering the sale of the home so that the
Court could make an equitable division of the marital property? This issue
raises both issues of law and of fact. This Court reviews the legal issues raised
by Judge Young's decision for correctness, State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421,425
(Utah 1991), and reviews Judge Young's factual error for abuse of discretion.
David K. Mast v. Brent Overson, No. 971586-CA (Utah App. Dec. 31, 1998.).
This issue was preserved in the trial court in Respondent/Appellant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Objection to Form of Proposed Di-

7

vorce Decree (Index No. 81), }IB 19.
5.

Did Judge Young commit reversible error by awarding a pproximately
$312,440 of the marital assets to the Appellee while awarding approximately
$191,919 of the assets to Mr. Linnell? This Court reviews the legal issues raised
by Judge Young's decision for correctness, State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421,425
(Utah 1991), and reviews Judge Young's factual error for abuse of discretion.
David K. Mast v. Brent Overson, No. 971586-CA (Utah App. Dec. 31, 1998.).
This issue was preserved in the trial court in Respondent/Appellant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Objection to Form of Proposed Divorce Decree (Index No. 81), JJIB 10-23, IC 1-15.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The following statutes are attached in the Addendum: Utah Code §30-3-5(7)(a)38;
Utah Code §78-2-2 (1996)5; Utah Code §78-45-7.5 (1998)31.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This appeal arises out of a divorce action presided over by District Court Judge
David S. Young. The case resulted in a trial before Judge Young on December 17,18,
and 21, 1998. On May 20, 1999, Judge Young entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. Because Judge Young's findings were objectionable, Mr. Linnell filed objections with the District Court, which Judge Young
heard on April 16, 1999. Judge Young denied Mr. LinnelFs critical objections, how-

8

ever. Court's Minutes Order (Index No. 121). Therefore, on June 28, 1999, Mr. Linnell filed a motion to amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of
Divorce, which Judge Young denied. Court's Minute Order (Index No. 228). Mr.
Linnell then filed his notice of appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The parties to this action were married for twenty-six years before the Appellee
filed for divorce.1 During their marriage, they had seven children, five of whom
were minors at the time of trial.2 Neither party has had formal education after
high school.

2.

From approximately January 1981 to December 1995 Mr. Linnell worked for a
lawn care company known as Lawnlife Corporation. Mr. Linnell's first job with
Lawnlife was an entry level position of "lawn estimator" and "lawn technician."
His duties included meeting with the public, giving quotes or bids regarding
service, and actually applying lawn treatments.3 Because he demonstrated outstanding qualities as an employee, Lawnlife's owners soon promoted Mr. Linnell to the position of manager of the company.4

3.

At the time Lawnlife promoted Mr. Linnell, the company was in dismal finan-

1

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17,1998, Vol I (Index No. 241), p. 18,1.21.

2

Id. at p. 19,11.9-16.

3

M a t p. 184,1.10—p. 185,1.23.

4

M a t p. 186,1.8—13.
9

cial condition.5 Mr. Linnell worked hard in his position as manager, and, despite his lack of formal education, Lawnlife became quite prosperous under his
management.6
4.

Although Mr. Linnell performed brilliantly as manager of Lawnlife, in December 1995 Mr. Linnell clashed with the principle shareholder of the company
over management matters and over the amount of Mr. LinnelTs salary. Because
of the conflict, Lawnlife terminated Mr. LinnelTs employment after fourteen
years of faithful service—he was forced to leave the company. Mr. LinnelTs
termination was involuntary on his part.7 Thus, three and one-half years before the Appellee filed for divorce in this action, Mr. Linnell found himself involuntarily unemployed.

5.

For about two years after his involuntary termination from Lawnlife, Mr. Linnell supported his family through consulting with lawn care companies.8 Dur-

5

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 186,1.
14—p. 188,1.5.

6

M at p. 68,1.19—p. 69,1.23.

7

Id. at p. 192, 11. 1 -11; p. 193,11. 21 -23. Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18,
1998, Vol. II (Index No. 242), p. 220,11. 1 -24. The Appellee conceded at her deposition and at trial that Mr. LinnelTs employment with Lawnlife had been involuntarily
terminated. Deposition Transcript of Carolyn Linnell, November 12, 1998 (Index
No. 245), p. 39,11. 14-19; Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 69,11. 21 -23. This fact was also conceded by Appellee's counsel at
trial to prevent further cross examination on this issue. Id. at p. 71,11. 1-9.
8

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18,1998 (Index No. 242), R220, U. 19-21.
10

ing that time, Mr. Linnell earned between $26,000 and $29,000 per year. 9 In
addition, for several years before the divorce, the Appellee's wealthy father,
Harold Hammond, made gifts to her of approximately $20,000.00 per year.10
6.

However, even though the Appellee's father regularly made annual gifts to her
of $20,000.00, Mr. Linnell was not satisfied with the family's finances. Therefore, in late 1996, Mr. Linnell consulted with the Appellee regarding the possibility of starting his own lawn care company with a friend.ll

7.

The Appellee initially did not want Mr. Linnell to start a new company. She was
opposed to a new company because she knew that such a venture would require Mr. Linnell to work grueling hours—twelve to fourteen hour days, seven
days a week.12 She was also opposed to the startup of a new company because if
would mean that Mr. Linnell would make less money.13

8.

Nonetheless, after discussions about the venture, the Appellee decided to support Mr. Linnell in starting up his own lawn care company. The Appellee gave
Mr. Linnell her approval and support even though she knew it would mean

9

Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 5; Defendants Exhibits Nos. 18 and 19.

10

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 86,1.
25—p. 89,1.8.
11

M a t p. 89,11. 15-18.

12

W. at p. 89,1. 19—p. 90,1. 10.

13

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 91,11. 3 11.
11

that the couple would experience financial hardship in the beginning.14 Even
though the couple had made the decision to found a lawn care company, however, Mr. Linnell did not have sufficient capital to start the venture. Therefore,
after the Appellee approved Mr. LinnelFs plan, the Appellee's father loaned
Mr. Linnell money to start the company.15
9.

After discussing the matter fully with the Appellee and after obtaining her
blessing and her father's financial backing, Mr. Linnell started Green Pointe
Lawncare, Inc. in January 1997,16 seven months before the Appellee filed for divorce. Mr. Linnell owns 50% of the business, and his partner owns the remaining 50%.17 Since he formed Green Pointe, Mr. Linnell has devoted his full time
efforts to building the business and making it profitable.

10. In a determined effort to make Green Pointe a success, Mr. Linnell has worked
grueling hours. During the summer, he works from ten to sixteen hours a day
during the week, and four to five hours a day on the weekend.18 During the
winter, Mr. Linnell generally works ten hours each week day an d does some

14

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 91,11. 1223.
15

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 1998, Vol. II (Index No. 242), p. 227,11. 819.

16

M a t p. 227,11.1-6.

17

M a t p. 227,11. 6-7.

18

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 95,11. 1518.
12

work on the weekends. He has not taken more than a couple of days for vacation since the business was founded.19 Thus, Green Pointe has employed Mr.
Linnell full time since January 1997. Yet in 1997, Green Pointe's business had
not yet developed to the point that any revenues were available to pay Mr. Linnell and his partner. Despite no cash disbursements to Mr. Linnell and his
partner in 1997, Green Pointe nonetheless suffered a loss of $1,698.00 in 1997.
Defendant's Exhibit II. In 1998, Green Pointe's business had improved to the
point at which it was able to pay Mr. Linnell. Even though Green Point paid
Mr. Linnell and his partner only $14,277.31 each in 1998, Green Pointe su ffered a loss of $1,146.38. Defendant's Exhibit 20.
11. Notwithstanding Mr. LinnelTs extraordinary efforts to make Green Pointea
success, and notwithstanding the admissions of the Appellee and her cou nsel
that Mr. Linnell had been involuntarily terminated from Lawnlife, the Appellee
nonetheless maintained that Mr. Linnell was voluntarily underemployed and
that additional income should be imputed to him for the purpose of calculating
Mr. LinnelTs child support and alimony obligations. In support of this assertion, the Appellee offered as evidence only the testimony of her expert witness,
Peter Woodward Philips, a professor of economics who purports to be a specialist of labor economics.20 The Appellee asked her labor economist to render

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 96,11. 9 19.
20

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17,1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), pp. 112-143.
13

two opinions:
a. "Given an individual with experience, skills and accomplishments in the
lawn care industry here in Utah as an administrator of business, what
would be the prospects of obtaining a similar occupation in and around
Utah?"
b. "Assuming that such a position as a chief administrative officer, prime supervisor of such a lawn care company were attained, what would be the income prospects of such an operation, were the job attained?"21
12. The Appellee's labor economist performed no investigation before rendering
an opinion regarding the first of the two questions. Rather, he made certain
random "assumptions" upon which he performed a statistical analysis in order
to answer the second of the two questions. He testified that "because I had two
questions put before me, I used those assumptions primarily in asking and answering the second of those.. .two questions."22
13. The Appellee's 1 abor economist did not perform a field survey to determine
whether there actually were supervisory lawn care jobs available in the Salt
Lake City market.23 He did not perform such a survey because that "kind of re-

21

M a t p. 115,11. 15-25.

22

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17,1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 116,11.2124.
23

Id. at p. 134,11.22-25.
14

search, particularly the sort of research that you're suggesting, would be relatively expensive. It will require field interviews on my part and fairly time consuming."24 Indeed, the Appellee's labor economist did nothing other "than
looking in the yellow pages...."25 He made no other attempt to even identify
what other lawn care companies operate in Utah. He did not investigate which
Utah lawn care companies actually employ managers.26 He did not know how
many of the companies were owner operated.27 He did not know how many of
the companies were large enough to afford a manager.28 He did no investigation to see if any Utah lawn care company had any available managerial positions.29 In short, rather than perform an investigation into whether Mr. Linnell
could really expect to get a managerial job in the lawn care industry, the Appellee's labor economist relied on government statistical data published by the
Utah State Labor Market Information Service to perform a statistical analysis
of the lawn care industry in general, and rendered an opinion that the "lawn

24

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 134,1.
22—p.135,1.9.
25

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 135,11.
17-22.

26

M a t p. 136,11.2-5.

27

Id. at p. 136,11.6-7.

28

Id. at p. 136,11.8-10.

29

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 135,1.
1—p.136,1.22.
15

and garden care business is a very rapidly growing segment of the Utah labor
market."30 Based on that brilliant ivory tower analysis, he then opined that "an
individual with experience and qualifications for being a manager or administrator of a lawn care business would have good prospects, or at least reasonable prospects, of finding such an occupation over a reasonable period of time.
Say perhaps two years ofjob search."31 (emphasis added). Thus, the Appellee's
own expert labor economist opined that it could take two years for Mr. Linnell
to find employment in a managerial position in the lawn care industry. Regarding the likelihood that a similarly situated person could obtain such employment in one or two months, the Appellee's expert testified that "they're substantially less likely to come to successful fruition."32
14. Assuming that Mr. Linnell could find such employment, the Appellee's labor
economist opined that Mr. Linnell would make approximately $41,000.00 per
year based on a normal work week.33 The Appellee offered no other evidence
regarding the employability of Mr. Linnell or of his possible salary if he were
successful in finding employment. Moreover, the Appellee's labor economist
testified that the lawn care business was one of the best industries in Utah to

30

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 119,1.
8—p. 121,1.23.

31

Id. at p. 122,11.3-9.

32

M a t p. 135,11.10-16.

33

Mat p. 129,11.23-25.
16

start a new company.34 Thus, based on the Appellee's own expert's testimony,
Mr. LinnelTs highest and best use would be to start his own lawn care company.
15. Unlike the Appellee's economist, Mr. LinnelTs employment expert looked to
see what jobs were actually available for someone with Mr. LinnelTs qualifications before she rendered an opinion regarding his employability. Defendant's
Exhibit 31. Dr. Kristy Farnsworth testified, for example, that the Utah Department of Workforce Services listed no jobs in landscape supervision for someone with Mr. LinnelTs qualifications.3" Based on actual Utah job availability
data, she opined that if Mr. Linnell were required to stop working for Green
Pointe and get another job, a he probably would most likely be able to become
employed as an account representative, sales associate or management trainee,
and that the starting salary would range probably somewhere between $24,800
up to $30,300."36
16. During the course of the trial, Mr. Linnell introduced evidence and asserted
that his "highest and best use" was in operating Green Pointe.37 In response to

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 133,1.
12—p. 134,1.6.
35

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 1998, Vol. II (Index No. 242), p. 337,11. 3-

9.
36

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 1998, Vol. II (Index No. 242), p. 340,11.
15-20.

37

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 189,11. 1917

such evidence and assertions, Judge Young stated that: "I don't think there's
any dispute that he's in his highest and best employment."38 Regarding Mr.
LinnelTs work at Green Pointe, the following exchange took place during trial:
THE COURT: I don't think Mr. Christensen is arguing that he ought
to seek another job. I don't think that's the argument; is it, Mr. Christensen?
MR. CHRISTENSEN: No, the argument is determining what his earnings are for purposes of child support and alimony, and it's what's to
be imputed to him. Not that he take another job.
THE COURT: Right. That's what I understand.39
17. Thus, the Appellee does not dispute, and has not disputed, that Mr. LinnelTs
highest and best use is to continue his present employment with Green Pointe.
Moreover, Judge Young clearly understood during trial that there was no dispute that Mr. Linnell was in his "highest and best employment," and that the
Appellee did not assert that Mr. Linnell should take another job.
18. Nonetheless, Judge Young went on to make Findings of Fact that are inconsistent with the record. First, Judge Young entered Finding No. 11, which states:
"Respondent, himself, has acknowledged his ability to earn $35,000.00 per
year." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124), p. 4, f 11.
There is no evidence whatsoever in the record to support this finding. This

20.
38

M a t p. 189,11.23-24.

39

Id at p. 190,11. 13-20; Defendant's Exhibit 31.
18

matter was addressed and argued at a hearing regarding Mr. LinnelTs objections to the Appellee's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.40 In
overruling Mr. LinnelTs objection that there is no evidence in the record that
he acknowledged that he could earn $35,000.00 per year, the following exchange took place, which succinctly illustrates the tone of this litigation:
THE COURT: I don't think he's going to find his earnings are going to
be much off of that when the business gets settled and gets going. You
know, they're [Hal Christensen and his client are] entitled to prepare
their findings and their decree, and if we have 13 to 15, 14 pages of
this, we have to labor through these kinds of objections, I don't see
that in the future there would be any disadvantage if there were a
modification filed to have a finding in there that says, "He's acknowledged he can earn $35,000 a year." If experience shows that he
doesn't, then I have to deal with that experience. If experience shows
he earns $50,000 a year, then I have to deal with that experience.
MR. STEFFENSEN: That's fine. Then let's have the language say that
experience shows that. My problem is—
THE COURT: I'm not going to—he's [Hal Christensen's] entitled to
write it with the adjectives he wants to choose, and I don't think we
ought to be laboring—I want to deal with substantive matters. If you
think there's an inaccuracy in the evidence, then let's deal with that.
MR. STEFFENSEN: I do, because my client never said that.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, the objection is overruled.41
19. At no time during the preceding exchange did Judge Young explain his theory
that a trial court should make a finding of fact simply because a prevailing
party drafts the proposed finding to include self-serving statements that are en-

Transcript of April 16,1999 Hearing (Index No. 244), p. 9,1. 17—p. 11,1. 19.
41

Transcript of April 16, 1999 Hearing (Index No. 244), p. 10,1. 19—p. 11,1. 19.
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tirely without evidentiary basis.
20. Judge Young went on to find that an individual such as Mr. Linnell should be
able to make between $30,000.00 and $50,000.00 per year, and that Mr. Linnell
was voluntarily underemployed because Green Pointe should use its available
capital to pay Mr. Linnell rather than to pay Green Pointe's operating expenses
or debts.42 Judge Young then imputed income to Mr. Linnell of $40,000.00, or
$3,333.33 per month.43 Judge Young made this finding despite the agreement
of all concerned that Mr. LinnelTs employment with Green Pointe was hi s
highest and best use.
21. Because Judge Young supported his imputation of income to Mr. Linnell on
the ground that Green Pointe supposedly had cash assets of $38,246.10 that it
could distribute to its owners,44 Mr. Linnell objected to the Appellee's proposed
finding of fact 12 on the following grounds:45
a. Judge Young erred in determining the actual amount of Green Pointe's
cash assets;46
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124,127) p. 4, Jf 10-12.

43

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124,127-128), p. 4, 513.

44

Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion to Amend Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of law, and Decree of Divorce (Index No. 189), p. 2, J 5.

45

Id. at p. 2-3, J5.
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Defendant's Exhibit D-20, 1998 Profit and Loss Statement of Green Pointe. Defendant's Exhibit D-21, Green Pointe Balance Sheet. Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18,1999, Vol. II (Index No. 242), p. 229,1. 14—p. 238,1. 1.
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b. the amount of "cash on hand" reflected Green Pointe's uncollected accounts receivable even though Green Pointe might not be able to collect
on those accounts;47
c. Mr. LinnelTs undisputed testimony and the undisputed testimony of his
accounting expert witness was that the cash was not available for distribution because Green Pointe needed the cash to pay its ongoing operating
expenses;48 and
d. Utah law prohibited the distribution of Green Pointers cash assets to its
shareholders because it would render the corporation insolvent.
22. According to Mr. LinnelTs expert accountant, Green Pointe's Profit and Loss
Statement for 1998 and Balance Sheet demonstrated that Green Point had no
value based on the two most common methods of valuing a business. From the
"income approach" of business valuation, Green Pointe had no value because
"the business is showing a loss from operations, and showed a loss for the prior

47

Defendant's Exhibit D-20, 1998 Profit and Loss Statement of Green Pointe. Defendant's Exhibit D-21, Green Pointe Balance Sheet. Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 1999, Vol. II (Index No. 242), p. 229,1. 14—p. 238,1. 1.
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Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 1998, Vol. II (Index No. 242), p. 237,1.
23—-p. 238,1. 1.; p. 296,1. 10—p. 297,1. 4. Mr. Linnell further asserted that the cash
was not available for distribution under Utah Code §16-10a-640(3), which prohibits
distributions to shareholders where the distribution would cause the corporation to
be unable to pay its debts or to cause the corporation's total assets to be less than its
liabilities. Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion to Amend Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce, Index No. 189, p.9.
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fiscal year also."49 From a "net book value" a pproach to valuation, Green
Pointe had no value because "the equity in the balance sheet shows a negative
..

»50

equity.
23. The Court imputed income to the Appellee at minimum wage, to bring her income to $1,241.67 per month.51
24. Based on the imputed incomes of both the parties, Judge Young ordered Mr.
Linnell to make child support payments of $1,069.00 per month. Fin dings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124,136), p. 13, f 43.
25. Judge Young found that the Appellee's reasonable monthly expenses were
$2,486. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (Index No. 124, 135), p. 12,
f43.
26. In calculating Mr. LinnelTs alimony obligations, it is illustrative to use the following formula, which is commonly employed by the divorce commissioners
and judges in the Third District Court: (Appellee's monthly expenses - Mr.
LinnelTs monthly child support payment) - the Appellee's income = Mr. LinnelTs monthly alimony payment. Using this formula, the Appellee's monthly
expense of $2,486 less Mr. LinnelTs child support obligation of $1,069 per
month equals $1,417. After subtracting the Appellee's monthly imputed in49

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 1998, Vol. II (Index No. 242), p. 296,11.
12-13.

50

M a t p. 296,1. 10—p. 297,1.4.
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124), p. 12, f 17.
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come of $1,241.67 from the $1,417 number, the remainder is $175.33. Therefore, even using Judge Youngs own findings offact, which are clearly erroneous,
Mr. LinnelVs monthly alimony obligation should not he more than $17533 per
month. Nonetheless, Judge Young ordered Mr. Linnell to make alimony payments of $1,100 per month for a period not to exceed twenty-six years. In effect, Judge Young imputed income to the Appellee for the purpose of calculating Mr. Linnell's child support payments, but did not impute income to the
Appellee for the purpose of calculating Mr. LinnelTs alimony payments.
27. Regarding the division of the marital property, Judge Young awarded the Appellee $312,440 of the parties' $504,359 in marital assets (including their house,
which was valued at $380,000), and awarded Mr. Linnell only $191,919.52 Judge
Young made no factual finding that supports this grossly unequal division of
marital property.
28. At trial, Mr. Linnell asserted that the Court should order the sale of the parties'
major asset, their house, so that the Court could then fairly divide the equity in
the home in a manner that would substantially equalize the parties' assets and
standard of living. The Court valued the home at $380,000, and he found that
the parties had net equity in the home of $321,147.53
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (Index No. 124), p. 6, ff 19-40; Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Divorce Decree (Index No. 189) (Summary of Asset Division).
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124), p. 8, 530.
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29. In support of his assertion that the house should be sold, Mr. Linnell intr oduced unrebutted testimony, through his real estate expert, that there were
many suitable alternative homes in the immediate neighborhood on the market at significantly less than the value of the house. Mr. LinnelPs real estate expert testified regarding comparable homes that were within the same elementary school area as the school that the parties' children attend, Upland Terrace.
In the Upland Terrace area, there were twenty-one homes for sale, with an average asking price of $202,900.54 In fact, most of the homes were under the
$200,000 price range.55 During the prior year, seventy-six homes had sold in
the area and the average sales price was $189,334.56 When Mr. Linnell attempted to introduce detail regarding less expensive alternative housing in the
immediate area, the Court sustained the Appellee's objection on the grounds of
relevance, and would not permit such testimony/7
30. Ultimately, Judge Young declined to order the sale of the house so that the equity could be utilized to equalize the standard of living of the parties. Instead,
Judge Young found, without any evidence in the record to support the finding,
that it was in the best interests of the children that the Appellee be awarded the
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Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 1998, Vol. II (Index 242), p. 279,1. 2 —p.
280,1.11.
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Id. at p. 280,1.14.
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Id. at p. 282,11. 7-14.
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Id. at 285,1.23-p. 287,1.10.
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family home.58 Judge Young did order the Appellee to refinance the home, and
to pay to Mr. Linnell $100,000 so that Mr. Linnell could have less than one
third of the $321,147 that the parties had in the house.
31. Meanwhile, because of the Court's orders, Mr. Linnell has been reduced to living in poverty, staying in an attic bedroom he rents from the owner of a condominium. There are no facilities in Mr. Linnell's "Ann Frank" style room for
the children to stay in when they come to visit him.59 In short, visitation rights
of more than a few hours in a day are effectively impossible.
32. Thus, Judge Young's refusal to order the sale of the house and to divide the equity equally between the parties disregards the undisputed evidence established
at trial that the parties cannot afford to allow Mr. Linnell an acceptable standard of living if the Appellee is allowed to keep the $380,000 home. The undisputed testimony at trial was that the alimony and child support obligations,
when combined with Judge Young's grossly inequitable property division,
would result in severe financial distress to Mr. Linnell that far outweighs any
desire to keep the children in the current home when less expensive suitable alternatives are available.
33. Regarding the parties' cash assets, Judge Young found that as of October 1994
(over four years before trial, and three years before the Appellee filed for d i-

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124), p. 9, J33.
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Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. 1 (Index No. 241), p. 197,1.
8—p. 201,1.11.
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vorce) the parties had approximately $60,000.00 in cash.60 The District Court
also found that the Appellee had taken most of the family cash by transferring
$40,000.00 of the cash to her own certificate of deposit accounts, leaving
$20,000.00 in the parties5 joint account, which Mr. Linnell then deposited in a
separate account of their own.61 Judge Young then valued the marital cash assets as of October 1994, and ordered the Appellee to pay $10,000 to Mr. Linnell
to "equalize" the division of the parties' cash assets.62 The evidence in therecord indicates that Judge Young should have valued the marital cash assets as
of the time of trial, rather than at a time three years before the Appellee even
filed for divorce, for the following reasons:
a.

Although the Appellee testified that she took the family cash because she
was contemplating a divorce in October 1994, she did not actually file for
divorce until July 31,1997, nearly three years later;

b.

After the Appellee took most of the family cash, she used a small amount
of it for minor purchases, such as the purchase of family food and automobile fuel, thus expending only small portions of those cash on the fam-

' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124), p. 6, 520.
Id. at p. 6, 520.
l

Id. at p. 7, 522.

1

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17,1998 Vol. I (Index 241), p. 78,11. 15-20.
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c.

Mr. Linnell, however, used the remaining $20,000 of the family's cash to
pay much of the family's expenses for a period of three years;64

d.

At the time of trial, the Appellee had almost $57,000 of the marital cash in
two certificate of deposit accounts ($22,155.13 plus $34,860.98) that was
marital property, whereas Mr. Linnell had only $7,000 left in cash ($1,322
in his money market account and $5,708.27 in his America First Credit
Union checking account).65

34. There is no evidence in the record that would justify dividing the cash based on
the balance as of October 1994 instead of valuing the cash asset based on the
balance at the time of trial.
35. Judge Young's award of most of the equity in the parties' house to the Appellee,
along with most of the parties' cash assets, results in an overall property division that is grossly unfair to Mr. Linnell. The result is a division of the marital
estate that awards approximately $191,919.00 of the total value of $312,440 to
the Appellee.66 Thus, Judge Young made no effort to "equalize" the division of
the marital assets so that there was some equalization of the standard of living
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Id.
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124), p. 6, 521; p. 7, 5524-25;
p. 8, 526.
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (Index No. 124), p. 6, 5519-40; Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Divorce Decree (Index No. 189) (Summary of Asset Division).
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for both parties.
36. In making the grossly inequitable division of the marital estate, Judge Young
speculated about the possible growth in the business volume of Green Pointe.
Judge Young found that Green Pointe "will continue to grow in the future,"
and he relied on this nebulous speculation about the future growth of the
Green Pointe in dividing the marital assets. Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law (Index No. 124), p. 10, 540.
37. Judge Young valued Green Pointe as part of the marital estate, and found that
the parties' 50% interest in the company was worth $35,800. The District Court
awarded this 50% interest to Mr. Linnell.67 In reaching this valuation, Judge
Young necessarily included the value of Green Pointe's cash assets in the overall value of the company. However, as discussed above, Judge Young also imputed income to Mr. Linnell on the grounds that the company purportedly had
cash assets available for distribution to Mr. Linnell. If Green Pointe distributes
part of its cash assets to Mr. Linnell in salary, then the net worth and future
growth of the company is adversely impacted. Either the cash is available for
distribution to Mr. Linnell, or the company keeps its cash. But the cash assets
cannot be used for both purposes—to do so is to inequitably inflate the value
of Mr. Linnell's award of the parties' interest in Green Pointe or to inequitably
inflate the income imputed to him. In short, either the company uses the cash

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law(Index No. 124), p. 10, 540.
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for its operating expenses, or it distributes the cash to Mr. Linnell. But it cannot
do both.
38. Ultimately, the evidence in this action reveals that Judge Young has committed
reversible error in calculating Mr. LinnelTs alimony and child support obligations. Moreover, the evidence proves that Judge Young's division of the marital
assets between the parties has resulted in great and unjust hardship to Mr. Linnell.
39. Judge Young's treatment of Mr. Linnell in this case is not only inequitable,
however. His treatment of Mr. Linnell is irrational. Judge Young himself practically invited this Court's reversal of his rulings during the final day of trial. In
response to Mr. LinnelPs argument that the Court's rulings are unworkable,
Judge Young stated: "Well, I'd like to make a rational order, but it sounds to
me like I'm going to make an irrational order no matter what I do."68
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence in this case proves that Mr. Linnell was employed by Green Pointe in
his highest and best use, and that Mr. Linnell has worked hard to provide for his
family. Under Utah law, a District Court can only impute income to a person who is
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed for the purpose of reducing child support or alimony obligations. Because Mr. Linnell was not voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed, and because Judge Young did not make findings sufficient to i m-
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Transcript of Bench Trial, December 21, 1998, Vol. Ill (Index No. 243), p. 456, U.
14-16.
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pute income to Mr. Linnell, Judge Young's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell was
clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion.
Moreover, even if the evidence supported the imputation of income to Mr.
Linnell, which it does not, the record does not contain evidence sufficient to support
Judge Young's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell in the annual amount of
$40,000.00. Moreover, Judge Young did not make findings sufficient to impu te an
annual income of $40,000.00 to Mr. Linnell. Therefore, Judge Young's imputation of
income to Mr. Linnell was clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion.
In making an alimony award, the District Court must consider the mandatory
three Jones factors: 1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; 2)
the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or herself;
and 3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. In ordering Mr. Linnell to pay $1,100.00 per month in alimony to the Appellee, Judge Young either
made mathematical errors or failed to consider the second and third of these factors.
Moreover, Judge Young failed to enter findings of fact sufficiently detailed to support the alimony award. Therefore, the alimony award is clearly erroneous and an
abuse of discretion.
Because the parties' primary marital asset was the equity in their house, Judge
Young should have ordered the sale of the house and the equal division of the equity
between the parties. The evidence indicates that there were numerous suitable, yet
far less expensive, houses in the immediate neighborhood that the Appellee could
have purchased with her share of the proceeds of a sale of the house, with little re-

30

suiting disruption for the children. The District Court's refusal to order the sale of
the parties' major asset so that the marital estate could be divided equally, as well the
Court's failure to enter sufficiently detailed findings of fact supporting its decision
was clearly erroneous and constitute an abuse of discretion
Judge Young's resulting division of the marital estate awards approximately
$312,440.00 of the total value of $504,359.00 to the Appellee. Judge Young made no
effort to "equalize" the division of the marital assets so that there was an equalization
of the standard of living of the parties. Nor did he enter findings that detail the basis
for his deviation of the general rule that favors an equal division of the marital estate.
Therefore, Judge Young's division of the marital estate was clearly erroneous and
constitutes an abuse of discretion.
ARGUMENT
1. Judge Young's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell for the purpose of calculating alimony and child support obligations was clearly erroneous and an abuse of
discretion.
1.1. Under Utah law, the District Court can only impute income to a person who
is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed for the purpose of reducing
child support or alimony obligations.

Under Utah law, a District Court can impute income to a parent for the purpose of
calculating child support obligations if it makes a finding that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Utah Code §78-45-7.5 (1998). The District
Court can also impute income to a spouse under such circumstances when calculating alimony obligations. Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah App. 1994). "However,
the goal of imputing income is to prevent parents from reducing their child support
31

or alimony by purposeful unemployment or underemployment." Id. It follows that
the Court cannot impute income if a person is not voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Nor can the Court impute income if a person is underemployed for
reasons other than attempting to reduce child support or alimony obligations.
1.2. The District Court's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell is clearly erroneous
and an abuse of discretion because Mr. Linnell is not voluntarily unemployed or underemployed for the purpose of reducing his child support or
alimony obligations.

In the case at bar, the undisputed evidence is that Mr. Linnell is employed by Green
Pointe, and that he works extremely hard to provide for his family. Because he is
currently employed on a full time basis, Judge Young could not impute income to
Mr. Linnell on the grounds that he was unemployed. Therefore, in order to impute
income to Mr. Linnell, Judge Young would have to find that Mr. Linnell was voluntarily underemployed. The evidence, however, clearly establishes that Mr. Linnell is
not voluntarily underemployed.
Rather, the evidence establishes that despite his stellar success as the manager
of Lawnlife, Mr. Linnell was involuntarily terminated from that position se veral
years before the Appellee filed for divorce. Thus, Mr. LinnelTs subsequent attempts
to provide for his family in the lawn care industry do not constitute "voluntary" underemployment. In the years following the loss of his position with Lawnlife, Mr.
Linnell provided for his family by consulting in the only business he knows—the
lawn care industry. Moreover, when he found that he was not making enough
money consulting, he started Green Pointe with the hope of repeating his com-
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mendable performance at Lawnlife.
The self-serving opinion of the Appellee's labor economist is the only evidence
in the record that suggests that Mr. Linnell could find a position in the lawn care industry that is more lucrative than his position at Green Pointe. However, the Appellee's labor economist opined that it could take two years for Mr. Linnell to find another managerial position with a lawn care company. Moreover, the Appellee's labor
economist testified that he had not conducted field research to support his opinions,
and that he knew of no managerial jobs available with Utah lawn care companies.
Rather, the economist's opinion was based on an ivory tower statistical analysis of
government statistics.
In addition, Mr. Linnell's labor expert fully rebutted the testimony of the Appellee's labor economist. Mr. Linnell's expert testified that her investigation revealed
that there were no openings for managerial positions with Utah lawn care companies. She also testified that a person with Mr. Linnell's high school education and
qualifications would make a salary of between $24,000 and $30,000 in the jobs available in the Utah market.
Moreover, there is abundant evidence in the record that Mr. Linnell is not underemployed at all. Before he founded Green Pointe, Mr. Linnell discussed the venture in depth with the Appellee and sought her blessing. The Appellee was initially
reticent, knowing that Mr. Linnell would have to work long grueling hours, and that
in the early years Mr. Linnell would not make much money. Nonetheless, the Appellee eventually approved the Green Pointe venture. There is simply no evidence
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whatsoever that Mr. Linnell founded Green Pointe so that he could reduce child
support or alimony payments. Rather, he relied on the Appellee's blessing, approval,
and support in founding Green Pointe, and he has committed himself to making the
venture a success.
The Appellee's assertion that Mr. Linnell is underemployed is especially i ncredible in light of statements made on the record by both counsel for the Appellee
and Judge Young. The Appellee's attorney specifically represented to the Court that
the Appellee does not assert that Mr. Linnell should quit his job at Green Pointe and
get another job elsewhere. In addition, Judge Young clarified that neither the District Court nor the Appellee were advocating that Mr. Linnell should get another
job. Obviously, if income greater than Mr. Linnell's salary were imputed to him,
then he would be forced to abandon Green Pointe to get another job in order to pay
the resulting increased child support and alimony obligations. If Mr. Linnell were
truly underemployed at Green Pointe, then his salary would necessarily be inadequate to pay the child support and alimony obligations required of him under Judge
Young's income imputation. The remarks of counsel and of the Court indicate that
not even they believe that Mr. Linnell is underemployed in his position at Green
Pointe.
Thus, the undisputed evidence is that Mr. Linnell had only good intentions in
starting Green Pointe and that he has worked incredibly hard to make the venture a
success. There is no evidence that he started the company for the purpose of reducing child support or alimony payments. Moreover, Mr. Linnell could reasonably ex-
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pect to make only $24,000 to $30,000 if he left his employment at Green Pointe and
sought another job in the Utah market.
In summary, Judge Young's finding that Mr. Linnell is voluntarily underemployed and that income is to be imputed to him is against the clear weight of the evidence, and a review of the evidence suggests that the District Court has made a
grievous mistake. Given the evidence, it was clearly erroneous for Judge Young to
find that Mr. Linnell was voluntarily underemployed, and it was clearly erroneous to
impute income to Mr. Linnell that is greater than Mr. LinnelTs actual salary at Green
Pointe. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should reverse Judge Young's ruling. See
e.g. Cummings. v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472,476 (Utah App. 1991).
2. Judge Young's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell in the amount of $40,000,00
is dearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion.

There is no substantive evidence in the record that supports Judge Young's decision
to use the $40,000.00 per annum figure in imputing income to Mr. Linnell. In fact,
the only basis in the record for such an imputation is the opinion of the Appellee's
labor economist, who opined that Mr. Linnell might be able to find a job in the lawn
care industry with an annual income of $41,000.00 after a search of up to two years.
The Appellee's economist performed no actual survey of the Utah job market to determine whether such jobs were available, however. Instead, the economist relied
solely on an ivory tower statistical analysis of government statistics about Utah firms
in general. There is simply no hard evidence in the record that indicates that there
was a job in the Utah market that would pay a person of Mr. Linnell's qualifications
an annual salary of $40,000.00.
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Furthermore, Mr. LinnelFs labor expert rebutted the testimony of the Appellee's labor economist by testifying that her investigation of the Utah job market did
not reveal an available managerial position with a lawn care company. She testified
that someone with Mr. LinnelTs skills and experience could reasonably expect to
find a job with an annual income of between $24,000 and $30,000.
Perhaps because the record contains no substantive evidence that supports
Judge Young's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell, Judge Young did not make specific findings of fact supporting his imputation. At the very least, Judge Young was
required to include in his finding enough detail to reveal his reasoning process, and
his finding should have been more than a cursory statement that Mr. Linnell is voluntarily underemployed, is capable of earning more money, and that a $40,000.00
annual income is imputed to him. See Williamson v. Williamson, 372 Utah Adv.
Rep. 45, 46 (Utah App. 1999); see also, Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah
1997); Rehn v. Rehn, 974 P.2d 306, 310, 312 (Utah App. 1999).
In other words, Judge Young's findings should have articulated the basis for his
conclusion imputing $40,000.00 income to Mr. Linnell by showing the steps by
which the Court reached its ultimate conclusion. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234,1242
(Utah 1998), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 1803 (1999); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336,
1338 (Utah 1979). Although trial courts have broad discretion in divorce actions,
they must exercise their discretion "within the legal parameters set by appellate
courts." Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472,474-75 (Utah App. 1991). "[T]o ensure that the court acted within its broad discretion, the facts and reasons for the
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court's decision must be set forth fully in appropriate findings and conclusions."
Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993). Judge Young's Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law fail to satisfy the requirements that the Court of Appeals has repeatedly articulated.
Given the lack of substantive evidence in the record that would support Judge
Young's imputation of an annual income of $40,000.00 to Mr. Linnell, the imputation is so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, and
constitutes reversible error. Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338,342 (Utah 1999).
3- Judge Young's calculation of Mr. Linnell's alimony obligation constitutes an
abuse of discretion and is clearly erroneous.
3.1. Judge Young's finding regarding alimony is deficient as a matter of law.

Judge Young's finding of fact regarding alimony states:
46. Petitioner should be awarded $1,100,00 per month permanent
alimony for a period not to exceed the length of the marriage or until
terminated by operation of law. Based upon Petitioner's imputed income, Respondent's imputed income and both Petitioner's and Respondent's reasonable expenses, alimony of $1,100 per month is a reasonable amount.
At the very least, Judge Young's conclusory finding that Mr. Linnell is required pay
to the Appellee $1,100.00 per month alimony fails to include enough detail to reveal
the District Court's reasoning process in arriving at its conclusion. Judge Young's
finding should have been more than a cursory statement that Mr. Linnell is required
to pay alimony. The finding should have included a description of the values Judge
Young attributed to each of the items purportedly considered in a rriving at the
$1,100 per month figure. In addition, Judge Young's finding should have provided a
step by step analysis of the reasoning which lead him to his conclusion so that the
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parties and the Court of Appeals can determine whether the finding is clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. Williamson v. Williamson, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 45,
46 (Utah App. 1999); Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997); Rehn v. Rehn,
974 P.2d 306, 310, 312 (Utah App. 1999). Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1242 (Utah
1998), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 1803 (1999); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336,1338
(Utah 1979); Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472,474-75 (Utah App. 1991); Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993). Because Judge Young's finding
regarding alimony fails to satisfy the requirements established by the appellate
courts, his finding is in error and this case should be remanded to the District Court
for an evidentiary hearing and more detailed findings of fact by the District Court.
3.2. Judge Young's calculation of Mr. Linnell's alimony obligation is clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion because Judge Young failed to consider: a) the
Appellee's ability to produce income for herself, and b) Mr. Linnell's ability to
provide the support.

Under Utah law, Judge Young was required to make sufficiently detailed findings of
fact showing that he considered the following three mandatory Jones factors in determining Mr. Linnell's alimony obligation: 1) the financial conditions and needs of
the receiving spouse; 2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or herself; and 3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84,
90 (Utah App. 1989); Utah Code §30-3-5(7)(a). Although Judge Young did make
findings regarding the first factor, he failed to make findings demonstrating that he
considered the second and third factors. Indeed, the record indicates that Judge
Young must have willfully ignored the second and third factors, or at least made a
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mathematical mistake.
Judge Young's own findings demonstrate that the alimony award is clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. As to the first factor, Judge Young found that the
Appellee had monthly living expenses of $2,486. Mr. L innelTs monthly child support payment of $1,069 should be subtracted from $2,486 because the Appellee can
use the child support payment to meet the family's expenses. The resulting difference, which represents the Appellee's unpaid expenses, is $1,417. Because the Court
must consider the Appellee's ability to produce income, the Appellee's monthly imputed income of $1,241.67 should be subtracted from the remaining expenses of
$1,417, resulting in a difference of $175.33, which should be Mr. Li nnell's alimony
obligation. To arrive at the $1,100 alimony award, Judge Young either made a
mathematical error, or he failed to consider the Appellee's imputed income, which
the Court was required to consider in connection with the second factor mentioned
above.
In addition, the third factor Judge Young was required to consider is Mr. Linnell's ability to provide the support. Judge Young should have considered Mr. Linnell's "needs and expenditures, such as housing, payment of debts, and other living
expenses." Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 547 (Utah App. 1993). Judge Young found
that Mr. Linnell's "reasonable" monthly expenses total $949. When Mr. L innelTs
monthly expenses are added to his child support obligation of $1,069 and the alimony obligation of $1,100 are added together, Mr. Linnell's total monthly outlay is
$3,118, which is more than Mr. Linnell's gross monthly salary at Green Pointe, and
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nearly all of the gross monthly salary of $3,333.33 that Judge Young imputed to him.
Thus, in calculating Mr. LinnelTs alimony obligation, Judge Young either made a
mathematical mistake, or he failed to consider Mr. Linnell's ability to provide the
support.
Judge Young's failure to consider two of the three factors that he must consider
is clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion. Moreover, as the Supreme Court of
Utah has held, "An alimony award should, as far as possible, equalize the parties1 respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage." Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566
(Utah 1985). The alimony award to the Appellee does not even come close to equalizing the parties' standards of living. Rather, it condemns Mr. Linnell to live in poverty while the Appellee lives in a $380,000.00 home, with her e xpenses paid by Mr.
Linnell.
Therefore, Judge Young's award of alimony to the Appellee is reversible error.
4. Judge Young's award of the parties' house to the Appellee was an abuse of di scretion and was clearly erroneous.

Under Utah law, the District Court must distribute the marital property in a fair,
systematic fashion. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d, 1018, 1022 (Utah App. 1993). This Court
has held that each party is presumed to be entitled to fifty percent of the marital
property. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,1172 & n. 10 (Utah App. 1990), Hall v. Hall at
1022. The Court can order the sale of the marital house in order to distribute the
parties' equity to the parties on thisfifty/fiftybasis. Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 544
(Utah App. 1993). An unequal division of marital property, however, is only justi40

fied when the trial court memorializes "in comniendably detailed findings" the exceptionai circumstances supporting the unequal distribution. Thomas v. Thomas,
375 Utah Adv. Rep. 23,25 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
Because the parties' primary marital asset was the equity in their house, Mr.
Lirmell asserted that it was necessary to sell the house in order to equally and equitably divide the equity between the parties. The testimony of Mr. Linnell's real estate
expert is the only evidence in the record regarding the impact a sale of the parties'
house would have on the minor children. The real estate expert testified that there
were numerous suitable, yet far less expensive, houses in the immediate neighborhood that the Appellee could purchase. Mr. Linnell's real estate expert testified regarding comparable homes that were within the same elementary school area as Upland Terrace, the school that the parties' children attend. In the U pland Terrace
area, the evidence at trial was that there were twenty-one homes for sale, with an average asking price of $202,900. In fact, most of the homes were under the $200,000
price range. During the prior year alone, seventy-six homes had sold in the area and
the average sales price was $189,334. When Mr. Linnell attempted to introduce detail regarding less expensive alternative housing in the immediate area, however, the
Court sustained the Appellee's objection on the grounds of relevance, and would
not permit such testimony.69
Based on this evidence, Judge Young made the following finding:

Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 1998 (Index No. 242), p. 285,1. 23-p. 287,
1. 10.
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33. It is in the best interests of the children that Petitioner be awarded
the family home. If Petitioner were required to sell the family home,
she would not be able to find suitable housing for herself and the parties' five minor children with the net proceeds available. Moreover,
awarding Petitioner the family home will cause the least amount of
disruption to the children's lives.
There is simply no evidence in the record that supports this finding. To the
contrary, the evidence in the record is directly contrary to the finding. Where the
law presumes that an asset must be divided equally between the parties, it is especially inappropriate for the Court to enter such a finding without appropriately detailed findings setting forth the exceptional ci rcumstances supporting the Court's
conclusion. Because Judge Young did not enter any detail whatsoever to support his
conclusory finding regarding the best interests of the children, his refusal to order
the sale of the parties' major asset was an abuse of discretion, and clearly erroneous.
5. Judge Young's division of the marital property was clearly erroneous and const ituted an abuse of discretion.

Judge Young's decision to award the parties' house to the Appellee, along with the
Court's division of other marital assets, resulted in a grossly unequal and inequitable
division of the marital assets favoring the Appellee.
Under Utah law, the District Court was required to value the marital estate at
the time of the divorce decree or as of the time of trial. Shepard v. Shepard, 876 P.2d
429, 432 (Utah App. 1994); Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855, P.2d 260, 262 (Utah App.
1993); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218,1222-23 (Utah 1980); Peck v. Peck, 738
P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App. 1987) . The trial court can use a valuation date other
than the date of the decree or the date of trial only if the court supports its decision
"with sufficiently detailed findings of fact explaining its deviation from the general
42

rule. Shepard at 433.
The evidence in the record indicates that Judge Young should have valued the
marital cash as of the time of trial, rather than at a time three years before the Appellee even filed for divorce, for several reasons. First, although the Appellee testified
that she took $40,000.00 of the family cash because she was contemplating a divorce
in October 1994, she did not actually file for divorce until July 31, 1997, nearly three
years later. Second, after the Appellee took most of the family cash, she spent only a
small amount of it for the Family's needs, making minor purchases of items such as
food and automobile fuel. Third, Mr. Linnell used the remaining $20,000 of the family's cash to pay much of the family's expenses over a period of three years. Therefore, at the time of trial, the Appellee had almost $57,000 of the marital cash in two
certificate of deposit accounts, whereas Mr. Linnell had only $7,000 of the mar ital
cash.
Nonetheless, Judge Young valued the marital cash assets as of October 1994,
four years before trial. Judge Young found that as of October 1994 the parties had
approximately $60,000.00 in cash. Judge Young also found that the A ppellee had
taken most of the family cash by transferring $40,000.00 of the cash to her own certificate of deposit accounts, leaving $20,000.00 in the parties'joint a ccount, which
Mr. Linnell then deposited in a separate account of their own. Based on his October
1994 valuation of the cash assets, Judge Young ordered the Appellee to pay $10,000
to Mr. Linnell to "equalize" the division of the parties' cash assets. The result was an
award to of $47,000 of the marital cash to the Appellee, and an award of $17,000 to
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Mr. Linnell. Judge Young failed to make findings of fact e xplaining his deviation
from the general rule.
This ruling, combined with Judge Young's finding that the Appellee need pay
Mr. Linnell only $100,000 after a refinance of the home, resulted in an award to the
Appellee of approximately $313,440 of the $504,359 marital estate. There is nothing
in the record that indicates that Judge Young made an effort to "equalize" the division of the marital assets so that there was some equalization of the standard of living for the parties. Nor did he enter findings that detail the basis for his deviation of
the general rules. Therefore, Judge Young's division of the marital estate was clearly
erroneous and constitutes an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION

Judge Young's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell for the purpose of calculating
alimony and child support is clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion. So, too, is
Judge Young's failure to consider two of the three factors a trial court must consider
in awarding alimony. Judge Young's grossly unequal and inequitable division of the
marital estate is also clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion. Moreover, Judge
Young failed to adequately detail his conclusory findings of fact so that the parties
and the Court of Appeals can determine the reasoning behind his findings. Therefore, this Court should reverse such findings and remand this case to the District
Court for a new trial in compliance with Utah law. In the alternative, this Court
should reverse such findings and remand to the District Court for an evidentiary
hearing regarding the issues raised by Mr. Linnell.
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ADDENDUM

JUDICIAL CODE

493
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

30 district judges m the Third District,
12 district judges m the Fourth District,
four district judges m the Fifth District,
two district judges in the Sixth District,
three district judges m the Seventh District, and
two district judges m the Eighth District
1998

78-1-2.3. N u m b e r of j u v e n i l e j u d g e s a n d j u r i s d i c t i o n s .
The number of juvenile court judges shall be
(1) two juvenile judges in the First Juvenile District,
(2) five juvenile judges m the Second Juvenile District,
(3) eight juvenile judges in the Third Juvenile District,
(4) four juvenile judges in the Fourth Juvenile District,
(5) two juvenile judges m the Fifth Juvenile District,
(6) one juvenile judge in the Sixth Juvenile District,
(7)'two juvenile judges in the Seventh Juvenile District, and
(8) one juvenile judge m the Eighth Juvenile District
1999

78-1-2.4,78-1-3.

Repealed.

1996

CHAPTER 2
S U P R E M E COURT
Section
78-2-1

Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice and
associate chief justice — Selection and functions
78-2-1 5, 78-2-1 6 Repealed
78-2-2
Supreme Court jurisdiction
78-2-3
Repealed
78-2-4
Supreme Court — Rulemaking judges pro tempore and practice of law
78-2-5
Repealed
78-2 6
Appellate court administrator
78-2-7
Repealed
78-2-7 5
Service of sheriff to court
78-2-8 to 78-2-14 Repealed

78-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice
and associate chief justice — Selection and
functions.
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed
initially to serve until the first general election held more than
three years after the effective date of the appointment Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten
years and commences on the first Monday in J a n u a r y following the date of election A justice whose term expires may
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a successor is
appointed and qualified
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief
justice from among the members of the court by a majority
vote of all justices The term of the office of chief justice is four
years The chief justice may serve successive terms The chief
justice may resign from the office of chief justice without
resigning fiom the Supreme Court The chief justice may be
removed from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all
justices of the Supreme Court
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30
days of a vacancy in t h a t office, the associate chief justice shall
act as chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this
section If the associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to
act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief
justice until a chief justice is elected under this section
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of
the Supreme Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by
law

78-2-2

(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice The
term of office of the associate chief justice is two years The
associate chief justice may serve in that office no more t h a n
two successive terms The associate chief justice shall be
elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief justice determines If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice
The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate
chief justice as consistent with law
1990
78-2-1.5,78-2-1.6.

Repealed.

1971,1981

78-2-2. S u p r e m e Court j u r i s d i c t i o n .
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and
process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments,
and decree^ or m aid of its jurisdiction
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals over
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals,
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals,
(c) discipline of lawvers,
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission,
(e) final orders and decrees m formal adjudicative
proceedings originating with
d) the Public Service Commission,
(n) the State Tax Commission
(in) the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Board of Trustees
(iv) the Board of Oil Gas and Mining
(v^ the state engineer or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of
Natural Resource;* re\ lewmg actions of the Division
of Forebtrv Fire and State Lands
(f) final orders and decreeb of the district court review
of informal adjudicate e proceedings of agencies under
Subsection (e)
(g) a final judgment or decree of anv court of record
holding a statute of the United States or this state
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the
United States or the L t a h Constitution,
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony
d) appeals from the district court involving a conviction
of a first degree or capital felony
(j) orders judgments and decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments,
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas
(4) The Supreme Court mav transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has
original appellate jurisdiction except
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a
capital felony,
(b) election and voting contests
(c) reapportionment of election districts,
(d) retention or removal of public officers
(e) matters involving legislative bubpoenas, and
(f) those matters debcnbed in Subsections (3)(a)
through (d)
(5) The Supreme Court hab sole dibcretion in granting or
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a
Court of Appeals adjudication but the Supreme Court shall

78-2-3

JUDICIAL CODE

review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under
Subsection (3)(b)
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, m its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings
1996
78-2-3.

Repealed.

1986

78-2-4.

S u p r e m e Court — R u l e m a k i n g , j u d g e s p r o temp o r e , a n d p r a c t i c e of law.

(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule
manage the appellate process The Legislature may amend
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses
of the Legislature
(2) Except as otherwise provided by t h e U t a h Constitution,
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States,
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law
1986
78-2-5. R e p e a l e d .

1988

78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals The duties of the clerks and
support staff shall be established by the appellate court
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme
Court
1986
78-2-7. R e p e a l e d .

1986

78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court.
The court may at any time require the attendance and
services of anv sheriff m the state
1988
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. R e p e a l e d .

1986,1988

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS
Section
78-2a-l
78-2a-2
78-2a-3
78-2a-4
78-2a-5
78-2a-6

Creation — Seal
Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees
Court of Appeals jurisdiction
Review of actions by Supreme Court
Location of Court of Appeals
Appellate Mediation Office — Protected records
and information — Governmental immunity

78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals The
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal
1986

78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges The term
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is
until the first general election held more than three years
after the effective date of the appointment Thereafter, the
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
date of election A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
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and qualified The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or
fraction thereof for the period served
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment m
panels of three judges Assignment to panels shall be by
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals The
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a
chair for each panel The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from among the members of the court by majonty
vote of all judges The term of office of the presidmg judge is
two years and until a successor is elected A presiding judge of
the Court ofAppeals may serve in that office no more than two
successive terms The Court ofAppeals may by rule provide for
an actmg presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity
of the presidmg judge
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of
presidmg judge by majonty vote of all judges of the Court of
Appeals In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of
Appeals, the presiding judge shall
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels,
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court,
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of
Appeals, and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court
and the Judicial Council
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for
the Supreme Court
1988
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has junsdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary
(a) to carrv into effect its judgments orders, and decrees or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction
(2) The Court of \ppeals has appellate jurisdiction including junsdiction of interlocutory appeals over
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from
the distnct court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer
(b) appeals from the distnct court review of
d) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies, and
(n) a challenge to agency action under Section
63-46a-12 1,
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts,
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in
cnminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony,
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or
capital felony,
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
w n t s sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting
a challenge to a conviction of or the se ntence for a first
degree or capital telony
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary wnts challenging the decisions of the Board of
Pardons and Parole except m cases involving a first
degree or capital felony
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-

Art. VIII, § 1

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Section
6 [Number of judges of district court and other courts —
Divisions J
7 [Qualifications of justices and judges ]
8 [Vacancies — Nominating commissions — Senate approval ]
9 [Judicial retention elections 1
10 [Restrictions on justices and judges ]
11 [Judges of courts not of record ]
12 [Judicial Council — Chief justice as administrative officer
— Legal counsel ]
13 [Judicial Conduct Commission ]
14 [Compensation of justices and judges ]
15 [Mandatory retirement 1
16 [Public prosecutors 1
17 to 28 [Repealed 1
S e c t i o n 1. [Judicial p o w e r s — Courts.]
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme
court, m a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the
district court, and in such other courts as the Legislature by
statute may establish The Supreme Court, the district court,
and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of
record Courts not of record shall also be established by
Statute

1984 (2nd S S )

Sec. 2.

[ S u p r e m e court — Chief j u s t i c e — D e c l a r i n g
l a w u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l — J u s t i c e u n a b l e to participate.]
The Supreme Court shall be the highest court and shall
consist of at least five justices The number of justices may be
changed by statute but no change shall have the effect of
removing a justice from office A chief justice shall be selected
from among the justices of the Supreme Court as provided by
statute The chief justice mav resign as chief justice without
resigning from the Supreme Court The Supreme Court by
rule may sit and render final judgment either en banc or in
divisions The court shall not declare any law unconstitutional
under this constitution or the Constitution of the United
States except on the concurrence of a majontv of all justices of
the Supreme Court If a justice of the Supreme Court is
disqualified or otherwise unable to participate in a cause
before the court, the chief justice or in the event the chief
justice is disqualified or unable to participate, the remaining
justices, shall call an active judge from an appellate court or
the district court to participate in the cause
1984 (2nd s s )
Sec. 3. [ J u r i s d i c t i o n of S u p r e m e Court.]
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state law
certified by a court of the United States The Supreme Court
shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be
exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs
and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction or the complete determination of any cause
1984 (2nd S S )

Sec. 4.

[Rule-making p o w e r of S u p r e m e Court —
J u d g e s pro t e m p o r e — R e g u l a t i o n of practice
of law.]
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence to be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule
manage the appellate process The Legislature may amend
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses
of the Legislature Except as otherwise provided by this
constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired
justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform any
judicial duties Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the
United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in
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U t a h The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to practice law
1984 (2nd S.S.)
S e c . 5.

[Jurisdiction of district court a n d other courts
— Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction m all
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute,
and power to issue all extraordinary writs The district court
shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute The
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate,
shall be provided by statute Except for matters filed originally
with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal
of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with
appellate jurisdiction over the cause
1984 (2nd s.s)
S e c . 6.

[Number of j u d g e s of district court and other
c o u r t s — Divisions.]
The number of judges of the district court and of other
courts of record established by the Legislature shall be provided by statute No change in the number ofjudges shall have
the effect of removing a judge from office during a judge's term
of office Geographic divisions for all courts of record except
the Supreme Court may be provided by statute No change in
divisions shall have the effect of removing a judge from office
during a judge's term of office
1984 (2nd s s )
S e c . 7. [Qualifications of j u s t i c e s and j u d g e s . ]
Supreme Court justices shall be at least 30 years old, United
States citizens, Utah residents for five years preceding selection, and admitted to practice law m Utah Judges of other
courts of record shall be at least 25 years old United States
citizens Utah residents for three years preceding selection,
and admitted to practice law in Utah If geographic divisions
are provided for an> court, judges of that court shall reside in
the geographic division for which thev are selected
1984 < 2 n d S S )

S e c . 8.

[Vacancies — N o m i n a t i n g c o m m i s s i o n s — Senate approval.]
(1) When a vacancv occurs in a court of record the governor
shall fill the vacancv bv appointment from a list of at least
three nominees certified to the governor bv the Judicial
Nominating Commission having authority over the vacancy
The governor shall fill the vacancy within 30 davs after
receiving the list of nominees If the governor fails to fill the
vacancy withm the time prescribed the chief justice of the
Supreme Court shall within 20 days make the appointment
from the list of nominees
(2) The Legislature by statute shall provide for the nominating commissions composition and procedures No member
of the Legislature may serve as a member of, nor may the
Legislature appoint members to, any Judicial Nominating
Commission
(3) The Senate shall consider and render a decision on each
judicial appointment withm 60 days of the date of appointment If necessary, the Senate shall convene itself in extraordinary session for the purpose of considering judicial appointments The appointment shall be effective upon approval of a
majority of all members of the Senate If the Senate fails to
approve the appointment, the office shall be considered vacant
and a new nominating process shall commence
(4) Selection of judges shall be based solely upon consideration of fitness for office without regard to any partisan
political consideration
1992
S e c . 9. [Judicial r e t e n t i o n elections.]
Each appointee to a court of record shall be subject to an
unopposed retention election at the first general election held
more than three years after appointment Following initial
voter approval, each Supreme Court justice every tenth year,
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CORPORATIONS

(2) A restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of
shares is valid and enforceable against t h e holder or a t r a n s feree of the holder if the restriction is authorized by this
section and its existence is noted conspicuously on the front or
back of the certificate, or if the restriction is contained in t h e
information statement required by Subsection 16-10a-626(2)
Unless so noted, a restriction is not enforceable against a
person without knowledge of the restriction
(3) A restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of
shares is authorized
(a) to maintain the corporation's status when it is
dependent on the number or identity of its shareholders,
(b) to preserve entitlements, benefits, or exemptions
under federal, state, or local laws, and
(c) for any other reasonable purpose
(4) A restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of
shares may
(a) obligate the shareholder first to offer to the corporation or other persons, separately, consecutively, or simultaneously, an opportunity to acquire the restricted
shares
(b) obligate the corporation or other persons separately, consecutively, or simultaneously, to acquire the
restricted shares
(c) require as a condition to a transfer or registration,
t h a t any one or more persons including the corporation or
any of its shareholders approve the transfer or registration, if the requirement is not manifestly unreasonable, or
(d) prohibit the transfer or the registration of a t r a n s fer of the restricted shares to designated persons or
classes of persons if the prohibition is not manifestly
unreasonable
(5) The description of the restrictions on the transfer or
registration of transfer of shares in Subsection (4) is not
exhaustive
(6) For purposes of this section "shares"* includes a security
convertible into or carrying a right to subscribe for or acquire
shares
1992
16-10a-628. E x p e n s e of issue.
A corporation may pay the expenses of selling or u n d e r w n t
mg its shares and of incorporating, organizing or reorganiz
m g the corporation from the consideration received for shares
1992

16-10a-630. Shareholders' p r e e m p t i v e rights.
(1) Subject to the provisions of Subsection 16-10a-1704(3),
the shareholders of a corporation do not have a preemptive
right to acquire the corporations unissued shares except to
the extent the articles of incorporation so provide
(2) A statement mcluded in the articles of incorporation
t h a t "the corporation elects to have preemptive rights," or
words of similar import, means that the following principles
apply except to the extent the articles of incorporation ex
pressly provide otherwise
(a) Upon the decision of the board of directors to issue
shares the shareholders of the corporation have a preemptive right subject to any uniform terms and conditions prescribed by the board of directors, to provide a fair
and reasonable opportunity to exercise the right to ac
quire a number of the shares proposed to be issued in an
amount proportional to their percentage ownership of the
corporation s outstanding shares
(b) \ shareholder may waive a preemptive right A
waiver evidenced by a writing is irrevocable even though
it is not supported by consideration
(c) There is no preemptive right with respect to
d) shares issued as compensation for services to
directors, officers agents or employees of the corporation, its subsidiaries or affiliates
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(u) shares issued to satisfy conversion or option
rights created to provide compensation for services to
directors, officers, agents, or employees of the corporation, its subsidiaries, or affiliates,
(m) shares issued within six months from the
effective date of incorporation, or
(IV) shares sold otherwise t h a n for cash
(d) Holders of shares of any class without general
voting rights but with preferential rights to distributions
have no preemptive rights with respect to shares of any
other class
(e) Holders of shares of any class with general voting
rights but without preferential rights to distributions
have no preemptive rights with respect to shares of any
class without general voting rights but with preferential
rights to distributions unless the shares without general
voting rights but with preferential rights are convertible
mto or carry a right to subscribe for or acquire shares with
general voting rights or without preferential rights
(f) Shares subject to preemptive rights that are not
acquired by shareholders may be issued to any person for
a period of one year after being offered to shareholders
pursuant to the preemptive rights, at a consideration set
by the board of directors t h a t is nor lower t h a n the
consideration set for the exercise of preemptive rights An
offer at a lower consideration or after the expiration of the
one year period is subject to the shareholders preemptive
rights
(3) For purposes of this section "sharps" includes a securitv
convertible mto or carrving a right to su bscnbe for or acquire
shares
1992

16-10a-631 Corporation's
shares

acquisition

of

its

own

(1) \ corporation mav acquire its own shares and shares so
acquired constitute authorized but unissued shares
(2) If the articles of incorporation prohibit the reissuance of
acquired shares
(a) the number of authorized shares is reduced bv the
number of shares acquired bv the corporation effective
upon amendment of the articles of incorporation and
(b) as provided m Section 16 10a 1002 the board of
directors may adopt an amendment to the articles of
incorporation under Subsection (2)(a) without shareholder action in order to reduce the number of authorized
shares bv an amount equal to the number of shares
acquired by the corporation
(3) A corporation amendmg its articles of incorporation
pursuant to Subsection (2) shall deli\er to the division for
filing articles of amendment setting fori h
(a) the name of the corporation
(b) the reduction m the number of authorized shares
itemized by class and series
(c) the total number of authorized shares itemized by
class and series remaining after reduction of the shares,
and
(d) a statement that the amendment was adopted by
the board of directors without shareholder action and t h a t
shareholder action was not required
1992
16-10a-640. D i s t r i b u t i o n s to s h a r e h o l d e r s .
(1) Aboard of directors may authorize and the corporation
may make distributions to its shareholders subject to any
restriction in the articles of incorporation and tne limitations
m Subsection (3)
(2) The bylaws or in the absence of an applicable bylaw the
board of directors mav fix a future date as the record date for
determining shareholders entitled to a distribution other
t h a n one involving a purchase redemption or other acquisition of the corporation s shares If a rec ord date is necessary
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but no future date is so fixed, the record date is the date the
board of directors authorizes the distribution
(3) No distribution may be made if, after giving it effect
(a) the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as
they become due in the usual course of business, or
(b) the corporation's total assets would be less than the
sum of its total liabilities plus, unless the articles of
incorporation permit otherwise, the amount that would be
needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved at the time
of the distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights upon
dissolution of shareholders whose preferential rights are
superior to those receiving the distribution
(4) The board of directors may base a determination that a
distribution is not prohibited under Subsection (3) either on
financial statements prepared on the basis of accounting
practices and principles that are reasonable in the circumstances, including consolidated financial statements, or on a
fair valuation or other method that is reasonable in the
circumstances
(5) Except as provided in Subsection (7), the effect of a
distribution under Subsection (3) is measured
(a) m the case of distribution by purchase, redemption,
or other acquisition of the corporation's shares, as of the
earlier of
(I) the date money or other property is transferred
or debc is incurred by the corporation, or
(n) the date the shareholder ceases to be a shareholder with respect to the acquired shares,
(b) in the case of any other distribution of indebtedness, as of the date the indebtedness is distributed, and
(c) in all other cases as of
(u the date the distribution is authorized if the
pavment occurs within 120 da\s after the date of
authorization or
(II) the date the pavment is made if it occurs more
than 120 davs after the date of authorization
(6) A corporation a indebtedness to a shareholder incurred
by reason ot a distribution made m accordance with this
section if the indebtedness is unsecured is on a pantv with
the corporation & indebtedness to its general unsecured creditors except to the extent subordinated bv agreement
(7) Indebtedness of a corporation including indebtedness
issued as a distribution is not considered a liability for
purposes of determinations under Subsection (3) if its terms
provide that pavment of principal and interest are made only
if and to the extent that payment of a distribution to shareholders could then be made under this section If the indebtedness is issued as a distribution each payment of principal or
interest on the indebtedness is treated as a distribution, the
effect of which is measured on the date the payment is actually
made

1992

1G-I0a-641, Unclaimed
distributions.
If a corporation has mailed three successive distributions to
a shareholder addressed to the shareholder's address shown
on the corporation s current record of shareholders and the
distributions have been returned as undehverable no further
attempt to deliver distributions to the shareholder need be
made until another address for the shareholder is made
known to the corporation, at which time all distributions
accumulated by reason of this section shall except as otherwise provided by law be mailed to the shareholder at the other
address
1992
PART 7
SHAREHOLDERS
16-10a-701. Annual meeting.
(1) A corporation shall hold a meeting of shareholders
annually at a time stated in or fixed in accordance with the
bylaws
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(2) Annual shareholders' meetings may be held m or out of
this state at the place stated m or fixed m accordance with the
bylaws If no place is stated in or fixed m accordance with the
bylaws, annual meetings shall be held at the corporation's
principal office
(3) The failure to hold an annual meeting at the time stated
in or fixed m accordance with a corporation's bvlaws does not
affect the validity of any corporate action or work a forfeiture
or dissolution of the corporation
1992
16-10a-702.

Special m e e t i n g .

(1) A corporation shall hold a special meeting of shareholders
(a) on call of its board of directors or the person or
persons authonzed by the bylaws to call a special meeting, or
(b) if the holders of shares representing at least ten
percent of all the votes entitled to be cast on any issue
proposed to be considered at the proposed special meeting
sign, date and deliver to the corporation's secretary one
or more written demands for the meeting, stating the
purpose or purposes for which it is to be held
(2) If not otherwise fixed under Sections 16-10a-703 or
16-10a-"07, the record date for determining shareholders
entitled to demand a special meeting pursuant to Subsection
(1Kb) is the earliest date of any of the demands pursuant to
which the meeting is called or the date that is sixty days prior
to the date the first of the written demands pursuant to which
the meeting is called is received by the corporation whichever
is later
(3) Special shareholders' meetings may be held in or out of
this state at the olace stated in or fixed in accordance with the
bylaws If no place is stated or fixed in accordance with the
bylaws special meetings shall be held at the corporations
principal office
(4; Only business within the purpose or purposes described
in the meeting notice required bv Subsection 16-10a-705(3)
may be conducted at a special shareholders meeting unless
notice of the meeting is waived by all shareholders pursuant to
Section 16 10a-706
1992
16-10a-703.

Court-ordered m e e t i n g

(1) The district court of the county in this state where a
corporation's pnncipal office or if it has no principal office in
this state its registered office is located may summarily order
a meeting of shareholders to be held
(a) on application of anv shareholder of the corporation
entitled to participate m an annual meeting or any
director of the corporation if an annual meeting was not
held within 15 months after its last annual meeting, or if
there has been no annual meeting, the date of incorporation or
(b) on application of any person who participated in a
call of or demand for a special meeting effective under
Subsection 16-10a-702(l) if
(I) notice of the special meeting was not given
within 60 days after the date of the call or the date
the last of the demands necessary to require the
calling of the meeting was delivered to the corporation pursuant to Subsection 16-10a-702(l)(b), as the
case may be or
(II) the special meeting was not held m accordance
with the notice
(2) The court may fix the time and place of the meeting,
state whether or not it is an annual or special meeting,
determine the shares entitled to participate m the meeting,
specify a record date for determining shareholders entitled to
notice of and to vote at the meeting, prescribe the form and
content of the meeting notice fi\ the quorum required for
specific matters to be considered at the meeting, or direct that
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(c) a written statement indicating whether or not the
amount of child support requested is consistent with the
guidelines.
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under Subsection (1) is not available, a verified representation of the
defaulting party's income by the moving party, based on
the best evidence available, may be submitted.
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may only
be offered after a copy has been provided to the defaulting
party in accordance with U t a h Rules of Civil Procedure or
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in
an administrative proceeding.
(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving parties
shall submit:
(i) a completed child support worksheet;
(ii) t h e financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and
(iii) a written statement indicating whether or not
the amount of child support requested is consistent
with the guidelines.
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall
be used to review the adequacy of a child support order
negotiated by the parents.
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or combined
child support and alimony is adequate under the guidelines if the stipulated child support amount or combined
amount equals or exceeds the base child support award
required by the guidelines.
1994
78-45-7.4. O b l i g a t i o n — A d j u s t e d g r o s s i n c o m e u s e d .
Adjusted gross income shall be used m calculating each
parent's share of the base combined child support obligation.
Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the child
may be used to determine the award under these guidelines
1994

78-45-7.5.

D e t e r m i n a t i o n of g r o s s i n c o m e — I m p u t e d
income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, 'gross income" includes
(a) prospective income from any source, including
nonearned sources, except under Subsection (3), and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from an>one, prizes, dividends,
severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony
from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social
security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, disability insurance benefits,
and payments from u nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the
equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job However, if and only if
during the time prior to the original support order, the parent
normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at his
job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter
3, Part 3, Family Employment Program,
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program,
the Job Training Partnership Act, Supplemental Security
Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid,
Food Stamps, or General Assistance, and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of
a business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary
expenses required for belf-employment or business operation from gross receipts The income and expenses from
self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income
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available to the parent to satisfy a child support award.
Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to
operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection
may differ from the amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current
income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs
or employer statements and complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the court
finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of income from records maintained by the Department of Workforce Services may be s ubstituted for pay
stubs, employer statements, and income tax returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to
determine whether an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent
under Subsection (7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the
parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing is
held and a finding made t h a t the parent is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be
based upon employment potential and probable earnings
as derived from work history, occupation qualifications,
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds m the communitv
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall
be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a
40-hour work week To impute a greater income, the judge
in a judicial proceeding or the presioing officer in an
administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of
fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following
conditions exist
(I) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children approach or equal the amount of
income the custodial parent can earn.
(n) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to
the extent he cannot earn minimum wage,
(in) a parent is engaged in career or occupational
training to establish basic job skills; or
(IV) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child
require the custodial parent's presence m the home.
(8) fa) Gross income may not include the earnings of a
minor child who is the subject of a child support award
nor benefits to a minor child in the child's own right such
as Supplemental Security Income
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to
the earnings of a parent shall be credited as child support
to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by
crediting the amount against the potential obligation of
that parent Other unearned income of a child may be
considered as mcome to a parent depending upon the
circumstances of each case
1998
78-45-7.6. A d j u s t e d g r o s s i n c o m e .
(1) As used m the guidelines, "adjusted gross income" is the
amount calculated by subtracting from gross income alimony
previously ordered and paid and child support previously
ordered
(2) The guidelines do not reduce the total child support
award by adjusting the ^ross income^ of the parents for
alimony ordered in the pending proceeding In establishing
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make a defense as is j u s t to protect the rights of the
respondent and the interests of the state
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction
over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property,
and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as
the courts and judges possess in other actions for divorce.
(e) The petitioner or respondent may, if the respondent
resides m this state, upon notice, have the respondent
brought into the court at trial, or have an examination of
the respondent by two or more competent physicians, to
determine the mental condition of the respondent For
this purpose either party may have leave from the court to
enter any asylum or institution where the respondent
may be confined The costs of court in this action shall be
apportioned by the court
1997
30-3-2. R i g h t of h u s b a n d to d i v o r c e .
The husband may m all cases obtain a divorce from his wife
for the same causes and in the same m a n n e r as the wife may
obtain a divorce from her husband
1953
30-3-3.

Award of c o s t s , a t t o r n e y a n d w i t n e s s fees —
Temporary alimony.
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and
m any action to establish an order of custody, visitation, child
support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case,
the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party
to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action The
order may include provision for costs of the action
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation,
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic
case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon
determining that the party s u o s t a n t i a l h prevailed upon the
claim or defense The court in its discretion, may award no
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party
is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees
(3) In any action listed m Subsection '1) the court may
order a party to provide money during the pendenc\ of the
action for the separate support and maintenance of the other
party and of any children m the custodv of the other p a m
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entrj of the
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of
the action or in the final order or judgment
1993
30-3-4.

P l e a d i n g s — F i n d i n g s — D e c r e e — U s e of affidavit — Sealing.
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed b \ the
petitioner or petitioner's attorney
(b; A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default
or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken m the
cause If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the
respondent, evidence to support the decree may be submitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the approval of the court
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent h a \ e a child or
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both
parties have attended the mandatory course described in
Section 30-3-113, and h a \ e presented a certificate of
course completion to the court The court may warv e this
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of
the parties, if it determines course attendance and
completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible or in
the best interest of the parties
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council The
court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter
the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree
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after default of the respondent, upon the petitioner's
affidavit
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by
order of the court upon the motion of either party The sealed
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order
of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or
attorney filing a notice of appearance m the action, the Office
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full
access to the entire record This sealing does not apply to
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree
1997
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4.
30-3-5.

Repealed.

1990

D i s p o s i t i o n of p r o p e r t y — M a i n t e n a n c e a n d
h e a l t h care of p a r t i e s and children — Divis i o n of d e b t s — Court to h a v e c o n t i n u i n g
j u r i s d i c t i o n — Custody and visitation — Det e r m i n a t i o n of alimony — N o n m e r i t o r i o u s pet i t i o n for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include in it equitable orders relating to the children property,
debts or obligations, and parties The court shall mclude the
following in every decree of divorce
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of
the dependent children
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance
for the dependent children,
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6 5
(I) an order specifying which party is responsible
for the pavment of joint debts obligations or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during
marriage,
(II) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees regarding the courts division of debts obligations or liabilities and regarding
the parties separate current addresses and
(III) provisions for the enforcement of these orders,
and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recoverv Services
(2) The court may include, m an order determining child
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent If the court determines that the
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order
allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children
and their support maintenance, health, and dental care, and
for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is
reasonable and necessary
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other members of the immediate family, the
court shall consider the best interest of the child
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for
peace officer enforcement the court may include m an
order establishing a visitation schedule a provision,
among other things authorizing any peace officer to
enforce a court ordered \ lsitation schedule entered under
this chapter
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court
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shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
expended by the prevailing party m that action if the court
determines that the petition was without merit and not
asserted or defended against in good faith
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a
visitation order by a parent a grandparent or other member
of t h e immediate family p u r s u a n t to Section 78-32-12 2 where
a visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the
court may award to the prevailing party costs, including
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing
party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise
court-ordered visitation
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony
d) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse,
(u) the recipients earning capacity or ability to
produce income,
(111) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support
dv) the length of the marriage
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of
mmor children requiring support
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked m a busi
ness owned or operated by the payor spouse and
(vn) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to anv increase in the payor spouses skill oy
paying for education received bv the payor spouse or
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the
marriage
(b) The court mav consider the fault of the parties in
determining alimony
(c) As a general rule the court should look to the
standard of living existing at the time of separation m
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection
(7)(a) However the court shall consider all relevant facts
and equitable principles and may m its discretion base
alimonv on the standard of living that existed at the time
of trial In marriages of short duration when no children
have been conceived or born during the marriage the
court may consider the standard of living t h a t existed at
the time of the marriage
(d) The court may under appropriate circumstances
attempt to equalize the parties respective standards of
living
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the
threshold of a major change in the income of one of the
spouses due to the collective efforts of both that change
shall be considered in dividing the marital property and
in determining the amount of alimonv If one spouses
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the
efforts of both spouses during the marriage the court ma^
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital
property and awarding alimony
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short
duration dissolves and no children have been conceived
or born during the marriage the court may consider
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the
time of the marriage
(g) (l) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
substantive changes and new orders regarding ah
monv based on a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce
(n) The court mav not modify alimonv or issue a
new order for alimonv to address needs of the recipi
ent that did not exist at the time the decree was
entered unless the court finds extenuating circum
stances that justify that action

30-3-7

(m) In determining alimony, the income of any
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be consid
ered, except as provided in this Subsection (7)
(A) The court may consider the subsequent
spouse's financial ability to share living ex
penses
(B) The court may consider the income of a
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the
payor's improper conduct justifies that consider
ahon
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer
t h a n the number of years that the marriage existed
unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides other
wise any order of the court t h a t a party pay alimony to a
former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage
or death of that former spouse However if th e remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio payment of alimony
shall resume if the partv paying alimony is made a party to
the action of annulment and his rights are determined
(9) Any order of the court that a partv psv alimonv to a
former spouse terminates upon establishment bv the party
paving alimonv that the former spouse is cohabitatmg with
another person
1999
30-3-5.1.

P r o v i s i o n for i n c o m e w i t h h o l d i n g in c h i l d
support order.
Whenever a court enters an order for child upport it shall
include in the order a provision for withholding income as a
means of collecting child support as provided in Title 62-i
Chapter 11 Recovery Services
199**
30-3-5 2. A l l e g a t i o n s of c h i l d a b u s e o r c h i l d s e x u a l
abuse — Investigation
When in an\ di\orce proceeding or upon a request for
modification of a di orce decree ^n allegation of child abuse or
child sexual abuse is made mphcating either party the court
after making an inquirv mav order that an investigation be
conducted by the Division of Child and Familv Services within
the Department of Human Services m accordance with Title
62A Chapter 4a \ final award of custodv or visi tation may not
be rendered until a report on that investigation consistent
with Section 62A 4a 412 is received by the < ourt That mves
tigation shall be conducted by the Division of Child and
Family Services within 30 davs of the courts notice and
request for an investigation In reviewing this report the
court shall complv with Section 78 7 9
1999
30-3-5.5,30-3-6

Repealed.

1991 1993

30-3-7. W h e n d e c r e e b e c o m e s a b s o l u t e
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute
(a) on the date it is signed bv th^ court and entered bv
the clerk in the register of actions if both the parties who
have a child or children have completed attendance at the
mandatory course for divorcing parents as provided m
Section 30 3 11 3 except if the court waives the require
ment on its own motion or on the motion of one of the
parties upon determination that course al tendance and
completion are not necessarv appropriate feasible or in
the best interest of the parties
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the court mav
specifically designate unless an appeal or other proceed
ings for review are pending or
(c) when the court before the decree becomes absolute
for sufficient cause otherwise orders
(2) The court upon application or on its own motion for
good cause shown may waive alter or extend a designated
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROLYN HAMMOND LINNELL
Petitioner,
v.
DENNIS D. LINNELL
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND OBJECTION TO FORM OF PROPOSED
DIVORCE DECREE
Case No. 974903252
Judge David S. Young

Respondent Dennis D. Linnell respectfully submits his Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in support of his Objection to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
submitted by Petitioner in this matter and his Objection to the form of the proposed Divorce
Decree.
INTRODUCTION
The above entitled case was tried before the Honorable David S. Young on December 17,
18 and 21, 1998. Mr. Harold G. Christensen, counsel for Petitioner, was asked by the Court to
submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and also a proposed divorce decree.
Mr. Christensen did so, and his proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and proposed

Decree of Divorce are attached hereto collectively as Exhibit "A."
In this Memorandum, Respondent shall, first, list those findings of fact which Respondent
finds consistent with the Court's findings and rulings, second, set forth his specific objections to
the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as necessary to make the same consistent
with the Court's findings and rulings, and third, list those findings of fact and conclusions of law
that were omitted from the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that should be
contained in the same in order to accurately reflect the Court's findings and rulings. Respondent
shall then detail his objection to the form of the proposed Divorce Decree.
I.

Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
A.

Findings of Fact Not Disputed bv Respondent. Respondent has no objection to
the content of those proposed findings of fact set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 9,
12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 31, 40, 41, 43, 45 as the Respondent finds the same to
be consistent with the Court's findings and rulings. Moreover, Respondent does
not object to Conclusions of Law numbered 2, 3 and 4.

B.

Findings of Fact Disputed bv Respondent. The Respondent disputes the following
proposed findings of fact for the following reasons, with the intent to make the
same consistent with the findings of the Court and the undisputed testimony
presented at the trial of this matter:
1.

Finding No. 5. Respondent does not object to the first three sentences of
proposed Finding No. 5. Respondent objects to the last sentence of
proposed Finding No. 5 reading *'It is in the best interests of the minor
children to remain with Petitioner in the family home," as being
duplicative of proposed Finding No. 33. Respondent would delete the

sentence from proposed Finding No. 5 and leave the sentence in proposed
Finding No. 33.
2.

Finding No. 6. Respondent objects to the second and third sentences as
inaccurate. Those sentences should be replaced with the following text:
"Respondent managed LawnLife Corporation, a lawn care company, from
1984 to January of 1995, when his employment with LawnLife
Corporation was involuntarily terminated. After his employment with
LawnLife Corporation was involuntarily terminated, Respondent, from
January of 1995 through the Fall of 1996, performed lawn care consulting
services, primarily for Permagreen. When Permagreen informed
Respondent in the Fall of 1996 that Permagreen would no longer be
needing Respondent's consulting services, Respondent created a new lawn
care company, Green Pointe Lawn Care, Inc., consistent with
Respondent's highest and best use, namely, building and managing a lawn
care company.

3.

Finding No. 7. Respondent objects to Finding No. 7 because (1) it
excludes any reference to the parties' 1997 income and (2) the "'total
income" reported includes interest and investment income on certificates
of deposit and investments in Petitioner's name. Thus, not all of that
"total income" belongs to Respondent. Proposed Finding No. 7 should
read:
The parties' respective incomes from 1993 through 1998, according to
their tax returns and testimony, is as follows:

For 1993:
Petitioner
Wages
0
0
K-l on LawnLife stock
0
Taxable Employer paid benefits
Interest (joint)
1,090
Interest-LawnLife
145
Dividends-joint
10
Capital Gains-joint
1,245
Totals:

Respondent
119,289
31,699
12,384
1,090
3,415
145
10
168,032

Petitioner
For 1994:
0
Wages
0
K-l on LawnLife stock
0
Taxable Employer paid benefits
Interest (joint)
1,075
Interest-LawnLife
185
Dividends/Refunds-j oint
(912)
Capital Gains/Losses-joint
348
Totals:

Respondent
112,168
33,897
3,247
1,075
5,499
185
(912)
155,159

Petitioner
For 1995:
0
Wages
0
K-l on LawnLife stock
0
Taxable Employer paid benefits
Capital Loss-Lawnlife stock
0
Interest-joint
39
520
Interest
Interest-LawnLife
0
Dividends-joint
0
Consulting Income
0
Unemployment Compensation
0
Pension Distribution (Taxable)
559
Totals:

Respondent
7,741
7,702
201
(3,000)
39
2,934
6,222
0
25.026
1,518
109
49,045

For 1996:
Wages
Interest (joint)
Interest
Capital Loss
Consulting Income
K-l Loss
Totals:

Petitioner
0
78
2,049
0
0
0
2,127

Respondent
7,000
78
1.620
(3,000)
29,604
(52)
35,250

For 1997:
Wages
Interest
Other Income
Capital Loss
Consulting Income
K-l Loss
Totals:

etitioner
0
2,342
425
0
0
0
2,767

For 1998 (Excluding Imputed Income) Petitioner
Wages
0
Rental Income
3,900
Investment Income (Est)
2,400
Totals:
6,300

Respondent
0
877
34
(1,500)
1,139
(2,248)
(1,698)
Respondent
14,228.31
0
14,228.31

Finding No. 8. Respondent objects to said proposed finding because it
fails to recognize the undisputed evidence that (1) Respondent's
termination of employment with Lawnlife was involuntary and against his
will, (2) Respondent's loss of the Permagreen consulting account was
involuntary on Respondent's part, and (3) Respondent started Green
Pointe Lawn Care, Inc. with Steve Nicholaides. Finding of Fact No. 8
should read as follows:
After he was involuntarily terminated from employment as
manager of LawnLife Corporation in January of 1995 and
involuntarily lost Permagreen, his main account as a lawn care
consultant in the Fall of 1996, Respondent, after discussing career
and work options with Petitioner, voluntarily decided, with
Petitioner's support, to start and build a new lawn care business so
that he could continue to work in a manner consistent with his
highest and best use and protected from others being able to
terminate his services. In 1997, Respondent and Steve Nicholaides
formed Green Pointe Lawn Care, Inc. as a fifty percent equal
shareholders.

Finding No. 10. Respondent objects to said proposed finding because (1)

the undisputed testimony of Respondent's earnings capacity expert, Dr.
Kristie Farnsworth, was that there were no lawn care management jobs
available in Utah generally, (2) Petitioner's earnings capacity expert's
definition of "a reasonable period of time of searching" for a lawn care
management job in Utah with an income level between $30,000 and
$50,000 was "sometime within the next two years," and (3) the Court
found that given that it was Respondent's highest and best use to build and
manage the business of Green Pointe, the Court would not look to what
Respondent could earn elsewhere as a manager of another lawn care
company, but rather at what the Court determined Respondent could earn
at Green Pointe. The Court then imputed a wage of $40,000 to
Respondent because the Court found that with the expected future growth
of Green Pointe, Green Pointe would be able to pay Respondent that
amount in the future.
Finding No. 11. Respondent objects to said proposed finding as being
wholly inconsistent with his testimony. Respondent never at any time,
including at the trial, acknowledged his ability to earn $35,000 per year at
trial. Respondent understands that Petitioner, in proposing this Finding, is
referring to statements made by the Commission in his Pretrial Order to
the effect that in the Commissioner's view, Respondent's income
imputation would be somewhere between $30,000 and $70,000 per year.
Importantly, that was the Commissioner's view (and a view Respondent
disagrees with), not Respondent's testimony.

7.

Finding No. 14. Respondent objects to the last sentence of said proposed
finding because the undisputed evidence was that Petitioner, a few weeks
prior to filing for divorce, enrolled in school at Salt Lake Community
College on a full time basis, and since then, she has continued to be
enrolled in school on a full-time basis.

8.

Finding No. 15. Respondent objects to said proposed finding because (1)
it fails to state that Petitioner commenced her schooling mere weeks
before she filed for divorce, fails to state that Petitioner devotes her full
time efforts to her schooling activities and (3) fails to reference
Respondent's interest and investment income. That proposed finding
should read as follows:
A few weeks prior to filing her petition for divorce in this matter,
Petitioner enrolled as a full-time student at Salt Lake Community
College, with the intent of pursuing a five year
pharmacist/technician educational program. Since then, Petitioner
has devoted her full time and efforts to that educational pursuit. As
a consequence, Petitioner has not maintained any employment.
However, Petitioner earns $325 per month by renting a room in the
family home to a college student and further earns approximately
$200 per month in interest and investment income on her cash
assets.

9.

Finding Nos. 19 and 20. Respondent objects to said proposed findings to
the extent that they erroneously assert that "the parties contemplated
obtaining a divorce" in 1994, given that it was only Petitioner who had
that contemplation. Respondent further objects to said proposed findings
to the extent that they assert that "the Parties each opened separate
accounts and Respondent closed their joint account," to the extent that it

implies that the parties mutually agreed to do so. The evidence at trial was
that Petitioner unilaterally, and without prior notice to Respondent, took
$40,000 out of the parties' joint checking account at America First Credit
Union. Respondent then took $20,000 out of the account and moved it to
his separate America First Credit Union Account so that he would have
funds to support the family without that money being taken by Petitioner
as well, and left the remaining $5,000 in the joint account to pay family
bills.
Finding No. 21. Respondent objects to said proposed finding that
"Respondent paid some of the household expenses but provided no funds
for food or other expenses for the family," because the undisputed
testimony is that (1) Respondent paid all of the household and
expenditures, including mortgage payment, home insurance, all utilities,
telephone bill, car insurance, health insurance, car repairs, missionary
support payments, violin lessons, out-of-pocket medical expenses, kids
shoes and clothing, kids' school fees and expenses (see Denny's expense
spreadsheet), (2) the only exceptions were food and Petitioner's auto's gas
expenses, which food and Petitioner's auto's gas expenses were paid for
the most part by Petitioner, and (3) the source of Respondent's funds for
paying those expenditures, as admitted in the proposed finding, was the
First Security certificate of deposit accounts which held the $40,000 which
Petitioner took from the parties' joint cash assets in America First Credit
Union. It is thus grossly unfair and inaccurate to state that Respondent

"provided no funds for food or other expenses of the family."
11.

Finding No. 24. The Finding should read: "Respondent has $ 1,135.00 in
his personal checking account, a joint marital asset, which should be
awarded to him."

12.

Finding No. 25. The Finding should read: "Respondent has $1,322.00 in
his money market account, a joint marital asset and which, with the
balance in his America First Credit Union account, represents the balance
of the $20,000 Respondent removed from the parties' joint account with
America First Credit Union in October of 1994, which should be awarded
to him."

13.

Finding No. 26. The Finding should read: "Respondent has $5,708.27 in
his America First Credit Union checking account, a joint marital asset and
which, with the balance in his money market account, represents the
balance of the $20,000 Respondent removed from the parties' joint
account with America First Credit Union in October of 1994. which
should be awarded to him."

14.

Finding No. 27. The finding should read: "Petitioner has $2,000.00 in her
First Security Bank savings account, a joint marital asset and which
represents the remaining proceeds from Petitioner's sale of the Parties'
Suburban for approximately $6,000, which, at a value of $2,000, should be
awarded to her."

15.

Finding No. 28. The finding should read: "The Parties have a 50% interest
in a boat valued at $3,000, a joint marital asset, which 50% interest, equal

ss

to $1,500.00, should be awarded to Respondent."
16.

Finding No. 29. The finding should read: "Respondent has a 1993 Toyota
worth $9,000.00, a joint marital asset, which should be awarded to him.
Respondent should also be responsible for the $1,014.00 liability on the
vehicle."

17.

Finding No. 30. Respondent objects to said proposed finding because (1)
it fails to indicate that the home is a marital asset otherwise subject to
equal division, and (2) only two of the parties' seven children, Kara and
Mary Jane, have never lived in any other home (2/7 is not a "majority").

18.

Finding No. 32. Respondent objects to said proposed finding in that it
fails to set a drop-dead date by which Petitioner must complete the
refinancing and pay the $100,000 to Respondent. In this regard, the Court
at trial on December 21, 1998, asked Petitioner's Counsel if Petitioner
could determine within 30 days whether she could refinance the home and
pay Respondent the $100,000. A drop-dead date must be established in
order to prevent Petitioner's refinancing of the home and payment of the
$100,000 to Respondent from being delayed indefinitely. Respondent
further objects to the language of said proposed finding that "the costs of
such refinancing should be shared equally by the Parties." The Court's
specific direction in this regard was that Petitioner would pay all costs of
the refinancing.

19.

Finding No. 33. Respondent objects to the second sentence of said finding
on the grounds that Petitioner presented absolutely no testimony in support

<\0

of the asserted finding, and the testimony of Respondent's real estate
expert, Veda Barrie, as proffered by Respondent, was that there are
numerous homes in the immediate neighborhood that would constitute
suitable housing for Petitioner and the Parties' five children with no
disruption to the children whatsoever.
20.

Finding No. 34. The finding should read: "Petitioner has $16,041.33 in
her American Funds Group IRA account, a marital asset, which should be
awarded to her."

21.

Finding No. 35. The finding should read: "Respondent has $25,903.00 in
his American Funds Group IRA account, a marital asset, which should be
awarded to him."

22.

Finding No. 36. The finding should read: "Respondent has a $457.00
equity in his Southland Insurance policy, a marital asset, which should be
awarded to him."

23.

Finding No. 37. The finding should read: "Respondent has a $5,608.00
equity in his Reliastar Insurance policy, a marital asset, which should be
awarded to him."

24.

Finding No. 38. The finding should read: "Petitioner has credit card debt
of $1,264.39, a marital debt, which she should be responsible for.

25.

Finding No. 39. The finding should read: "Respondent has credit card
debt of $1,000.00, a marital debt, which he should be responsible for.

26.

Finding No. 42. Given that the issue of health insurance was never raised
by Petitioner at trial, nor discussed by the Court or either Party whatsoever

before, during or after trial, there can be no finding of fact as to health
insurance. Accordingly, proposed Finding No. 42 should be deleted.
Having said that, however, the issue of health insurance must, by statute,
be addressed in the Divorce Decree. In this regard, the Divorce Decree
provision regarding health insurance should be consistent with applicable
statutes, which provide that if insurance is available to one or the other
parties for the minor children through work at a reasonable cost, then that
party should provide it Any costs to the parties for insurance premiums or
non-covered medical expenses for the minor children should be equally
split. By law and by insurance contract, Respondent cannot be responsible
for covering Petitioner on any insurance he maintains for himself and the
minor children, nor can he be responsible for any costs associated with any
insurance coverage Petitioner may obtain either under continuation of
coverage (COBRA) type benefits or otherwise. To the extent Petitioner
seeks anything to the contrary, Respondent strenuously objects.
Finding No. 44. The finding should itemize Respondent's reasonable
monthly expenses just as Petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses in
Finding No. 43 were itemized. In this regard, the itemization is as follows:
Rent:

$200.00

Utilities:

$40.00

Telephone:

$19.00

Medical/Dental:

$40.00

Car Payment:

$155.00

Car Insurance:

$50.00

Car Taxes:

$50.00

Car/Gas:

$150.00

Food:

$150.00

Clothing:

$40.00

Laundry & Cleaning

$30.00

Miscellaneous:

$35.00

TOTAL:
28.

$949.00

Finding No. 46. Petitioner objects to said proposed finding because (1) it
fails to provide that alimony would cease upon the earliest to occur of 26
years (the length of the parties' marriage), her remarriage, cohabitation,
and (2) the alimony calculation was based solely on Respondent's imputed
income level of $40,000 and Petitioner's reasonable living expenses of
$2,486, without taking into consideration either Petitioner's imputed
income, Petitioner's actual rental and investment income, or Respondent's
ability to pay said alimony in light of his separate necessary and reasonable
living expenses.

29.

Conclusions of Law No. 1. To the extent that any of the foregoing
Findings of Fact objected to herein constitute Conclusions of Law as
asserted in the Paragraph 1 of the proposed Conclusions of Law,
Respondent objects thereto for the same reasons set forth above.

Omitted Findings of Fact. Respondent submits that the following findings of fact
should be a part of the Court's findings of fact in order to make the same

consistent with the evidence and the Court's findings. In this regard, Respondent
maintains that the list of findings set forth in Petitioner's proposed form is
selective and incomplete, and that as a matter of law, Respondent is entitled to a
finding of fact on all material issues. See The Boyer Co. v. Lignell 567 P.2d
1112 (Utah 1977) (the law is well settled that it is the duty of the trial judge in
contested cases to find facts upon all material issues submitted for decision unless
findings are waived). Those findings of fact that should be added to the final
findings of fact are as follows:
1.

Respondent's highest and best use is building and managing a lawn care
company.

2.

Respondent's termination as an employee and manager of Lawnlife
Corporation in January of 1995 was involuntary on Respondent's part.

3.

Respondent was forced to quit his lawn care related consulting business in
the fall of 1996 when Permagreen, his only client, unilaterally terminated
its consulting arrangement with Respondent.

4.

From and after Respondent's formation of Green Pointe Lawncare, Inc. in
January of 1997, Respondent has, with Steve Nicholaides who owns 50%
of Green Pointe, at all times been engaged on a full time basis in building,
managing and performing the customer service functions of that lawn care
business.

5.

Green Pointe, even though it did not pay Respondent or Steve Nicholaides
any money for their efforts in 1997, still experienced a loss from
operations in 1997 of $7,418.94.

6.

Green Pointe had sufficient revenues in 1998 to start paying monies to
Respondent and Steve Nicholaides in June of 1998. By December of
1998, Green Pointe had paid Respondent and Steve Nicholaides salaries of
$14, 227.31 each.

7.

If Green Pointe were to hire the services of lawn care technicians to
perform the services performed by Respondent and Steve Nicholaides,
Green Pointe would have had to pay more to those third-party lawn care
technicians than it paid to Respondent and Steve Nicholaides, thus
increasing the net operating loss that Green Pointe actually experienced in
1998.

8.

With paying salaries of $14,227.31 each to Respondent and Steve
Nicholaides, Green Pointe experienced a net operating loss of $1,146.35
through December 10, 1998.

9.

Green Pointe had cash in the bank at the time of trial of $36,085.44, which
Green Pointe needed to fund its operating expenditures of approximately
$9,000 per month through the "down" winter months, purchase another
truck to continue the company's ability to grow, and pay the salary
expenses of another employee that the company needed to hire to continue
the company's ability to grow.

10.

According to its balance sheet, Green Pointe's assets at the time of trial
were:
Current Assets:
Cash:
Accounts Receivables:

$36,085.44
2,160.66

Total Current Assets:
Fixed Assets:
Computer Software:
Computer Equipment:
Office Equipment:
Vehicles & Equipment:
Less Accum. Depreciation:
Total Fixed Assets:

$38,246.10
2,575.00
3,081.98
1,583.69
62,295.32
(24,940.96)

Total Assets:

11.

$44,595.03
$82,841.13

According to it's balance sheet, Green Pointe's liabilities at the time of
trial were as follows:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
Total:

12.

Note to Herald Hammond:
Accounts Payable:
Zions Green Pointe Credit Card:
Payroll Taxes Payable:
Prepaid Contract Liability:
Truck Loan: Zions
Truck Loan: FMC

$48,000.00
$1,516.29
$468.26
$4,642.04
$258.83
$16,728.91
$18,719.73
$90,334.06

As of the time of trial, Green Pointe did not have sufficient assets,
considering asset obsolescence and depreciation, to pay off all of its
liabilities.

13.

Green Pointe's assets and liabilities as of the time of trial were such that if
Green Pointe were to distribute its $36,085.44 in cash to its shareholders,
it would not be able to pay off its liabililities.

14.

Green Pointe's gross revenues from operations in 1998 were $119,323.52.

15.

The value of Respondent's 50% stock interest in Green Pointe of $35,800
was determined solely by multiplying the company's 1998 gross revenues
of $119,323.52 by 70%, and then dividing that number by 2.

16.

Respondent's working full time to build and manage Green Pointe is
consistent with Respondent's highest and best use, and it would be adverse
to the parties' interests and the best interests of the parties' minor children
if Respondent were to quit working to build Green Pointe and go work
somewhere else. That is true in principle part because of the three lawn
care companies in Utah who are capable of hiring a manager and paying
that manager the amount of income the Court finds should be imputed to
Respondent, those companies being Lawnlife Corporation, Permagreen,
and Chemlawn, Respondent has no ability to work for Lawnlife
Corporation or Permagreen (having already worked for the same and been
involuntarily terminated by both companies) and Chemlawn has'a
reputation for churning its managers every few years.

17.

According to Respondent's earning capability expert, Dr. Kristie
Farnsworth, there were no job openings available in Utah for managers of
lawn care companies at the time of trial.

18.

According to Respondent's earnings capability expert, Dr. Kristie
Farnsworth, managers of lawn care companies in Utah only earn between
$15,600 and $27,700, with $24,800 being the median income level.

19.

According to Petitioner's earnings capability expert, Dr. Dennis Phillips,
there was a reasonable likelihood that Respondent could find work as a
manager of a lawn care company in Utah "within a reasonable time,"
which he defined as "sometime within the next two years."

20.

According to the undisputed testimony of Respondent's earnings

capability expert, Petitioner, given her current educational status and job
skills, has the current potential of earning at least $13,520 per year (the
annual income range for immediate available jobs with Petitioner's
educational status and job skills was $13,520 to $18,720). Thus,
according to the undisputed testimony of Respondent's earnings capability
expert, Petitioner is currently, and immediately, capable of earning greater
than minimum wage.
21.

Included in the current balances of Petitioner's certificates of deposit
(account no's 076 999-264-0296 for $22,155.13 and 076 155 224 2866 for
$34,860.98), are the remaining proceeds of the $40,000 in joint marital
funds that Petitioner unilaterally removed from the Parties' joint checking
account at America First Credit Union in October of 1994 and certain gifts
of cash received by Petitioner from her father, Herald Hammond, which
remaining joint marital cash and gift monies were co-mingled together in
said certificates of deposit, and from which certificates of deposit,
Petitioner continued to pay joint marital and household obligations.

Objection to the Form of the Proposed Divorce Decree. To the extent the form of the
proposed Divorce Decree is inconsistent with the findings of fact and conclusions of law
that would be entered by the Court consistent with this objection, Respondent objects to
the form thereto. That objection is supported by the foregoing points and authorities,
which are incorporated here. By way of additional notes, (1) Section 9(a) is duplicative
of Section 9(e); (2) Respondent's alimony obligation in Section 5 should end upon the
earliest to occur of Petitioner's death, remarriage or cohabitation, or the expiration of 26

years from the date of the Divorce Decree; (3) the health insurance provision should
reflect the statutory requirements which, in its current form, it does not, and (4) Petitioner
is supposed to pay the costs of the proposed refinance.
SUMMARY
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent respectfully submits his Objection to Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and the form of the Divorce Decree, and requests that the Court
enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and also a Divorce Decree, consistent with this
Objection.
DATED this Ik day of February, 1999.

Davbi'W. Steffensen
Attorney for Responded

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the )V day of February, 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid, and addressed to the following:
Harold G. Christensen
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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DATED this W day of February, 1999.

ROBERT M. MCDONALD, P.C. (A2175)
DAVID W. STEFFENSEN, P.C. (A4677)
STEFFENSEN MCDONALD STEFFENSEN
Attorneys for Respondent
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 485-1818
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROLYN HAMMOND LINNELL
Petitioner,
v.
DENNIS D. LINNELL
Respondent.

OBJECTION TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND OBJECTION TO FORM OF
PROPOSED DIVORCE DECREE
Case No. 974903252
Judge David S. Young

Respondent Dennis D. Linnell respectfully objects to the proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law submitted by Petitioner in this matter as the same in certain respects is
inconsistent with the Court's findings and conclusions, and in other respects is a selective and
incomplete recitation of the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Respondent also
objects to the form of the proposed Divorce Decree to the extent it is inconsistent with the
findings of fact and conclusions of law that would result if the Court granted Respondent all of
the changes it has requested in and to the Findings and Fact and Conclusions of Law and entered
a Divorce Decree consistent therewith.
This Objection and Motion is supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

support hereof.
DATED this ]£_ day of February, 1999.
DAVIETW. STEFFENSEN, P.C.

David W. Steffensen
Attorney for Resp
CERTIFICATE OF xMAILING
I hereby certify that on the yfl day of February, 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid, and addressed to the following:
Harold G. Christensen
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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DATED this W day of February, 1999.

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROLYN HAMMOND LINNELL,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
ORAL ARGUMENT

vs.

Case No: 974903252 DA

DENNIS D LINNELL,
Defendant,

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

DAVID S. YOUNG
April 16, 1999

taunah

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): CAROLYN HAMMOND LINNELL
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID W STEFFENSEN
Video
Tape Number:
041699
Tape Count: 8:52-9:24

HEARING
This matter comes now before the Court on respondent's objections
to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree of
divorce; and on petitioner's opposition to respondent's objections.
Arguments are heard re objections and the Court states rulings for
the record.
Mr. Christensen to prepare findings and decree consistent with the
Court's rulings today and submit to the Court for signature.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third JuHicei District
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HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN (A0638)
RODNEY R. PARKER (A4110)
HEATHER S. WHITE (A7674)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

SALT LAKE COUNTY

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CAROLYN HAMMOND LINNELL,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
vs.

No. 974903252
DENNIS D. LINNELL,
Judge David S. Young
Respondent.

The above-entitled case was tried before Judge David S.
Young on December 17, 18 and 21, 1998.

Petitioner appeared

personally and was represented by and through counsel, Harold G.
Christensen and Heather S. White.

Respondent appeared personally

and was represented by and through counsel, Robert M. McDonald
and David W. Steffensen.

The Court heard evidence, received

exhibits and listened to the arguments of counsel.

Being fully

*>

informed and for good cause appearing, the Court makes and enters
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner and Respondent are, and for more than three

months immediately prior to the filing of this complaint have
been, residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Petitioner and Respondent were married on August 23,

1972.
3.

There are seven children born as issue of this

marriage: Heather, born February 17, 1973; James Tyler, born
September 2, 1976; John, born February 23, 1981; Sarah, born July
2, 1985; Emily, born November 29, 1987; Kara, born October 17,
1989; and Maryjane, born January 7, 1993.
4.

Petitioner and Respondent have irreconcilable

differences in their marriage which have made continuation of the
marriage impossible.

Petitioner should be granted a decree of

divorce from Respondent on those grounds effective December 21,
1998.
5.

During the course of the marriage, Petitioner has been

the primary caretaker of the Parties' seven children.

The

Parties do not dispute that Petitioner should be awarded sole
-2-

physical custody of the five minor children or that the Parties
should be awarded joint legal custody.

Petitioner is a fit and

proper person to be awarded sole physical custody of the Parties'
five minor children.

It is in the best interests of the minor

children to remain with Petitioner in the family home.
6.

Respondent has historically been employed in the lawn

care industry.

He managed a lawn care business from 1984 through

January of 1995.

From February of 1995 through 1996, Respondent

operated a lawn care consulting business.
7.

From 1993 through 1996, the tax returns of the Parties

report total income as follows:

8.

a.

1993 - $169,277

b.

1994 - $155,505

C.

1995 - $ 49,604

d.

1996 - $ 37,377

After he was terminated from employment as manager of

the lawn care company and lost his main account as a lawn care
consultant, Respondent voluntarily decided to go into the lawn
care business for himself.

Respondent discussed his career

change with Petitioner and she agreed to support him in his
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decision.

In 1997, Respondent formed Green Pointe Lawn Care,

Inc.
9.

During 1997 and 1998, Respondent devoted his full time

and efforts into building Green Pointe Lawn Care, Inc. and, as a
result, has not maintained employment elsewhere.
10.

An individual the same age as Respondent with the same

abilities, work experience and background should be able to earn
between $30,000 and $50,000 per year as manager of a lawn care
business in Utah.

Employment of this kind and at this income

level is available in Utah and should be obtained within a
reasonable period of time of searching.
11.

Respondent, himself, has acknowledged his ability to

earn $35,000 per year.
12.

In 1998, Green Pointe Lawn Care, Inc. paid Respondent a

salary of $14,227.31.

As of December 17, 1998, the company had

cash available for distribution to the owners in the amount of
$38,246.10.

Respondent's half interest is $19,123.05.

Based

upon those figures, Respondent could have received gross income
of $33,350.36, or $2,779.20 per month, in 1998.
13.

Respondent is currently not earning the amount of

income he has historically earned or is capable of earning.
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The

Court finds that Respondent is voluntarily underemployed and that
income in the amount of $40,000.00 per year should be imputed to
him.
14.

Until recently, Petitioner had no formal education

beyond high school.

Petitioner was employed outside of the home

on a limited basis at the beginning of the marriage.

However,

the Parties later jointly and voluntarily agreed that Petitioner
would not work outside of the home.

Petitioner has stayed at

home full time since then.
15.

Petitioner is enrolled as a full-time student at Salt

Lake Community College.

However, she earns $325 per month by-

renting a room in the family home to a college student.
16.

Although Petitioner currently suffers from a

hyperthyroid condition, she is able-bodied and physically capable
of working outside of the home.

However, Petitioner has very few

marketable skills and is only qualified to earn minimum wage.
17.

Income in the amount of $11,100.00 per year should be

imputed to Petitioner while she pursues her education.

The

$3,900.00 income Petitioner earns per year for the roomer should
be also be imputed to Petitioner.

The total amount of income

imputed to Petitioner should be $15,000.00 per year.

-5-

18.

Although during the marriage, Petitioner's father made

significant gifts to support the family, there is no evidence
that those gifts will continue in the future nor is it her
father's obligation to support the family.
19.

In 1994, the Parties contemplated obtaining a divorce.

Prior to that time, Respondent gave his compensation checks to
Petitioner for deposit in their joint account.

In 1994, the

Parties each opened and maintained separate accounts and
Respondent closed their joint account.
20.

Petitioner transferred $40,000 of the $60,000 savings

the Parties had accumulated and placed it into two certificates
of deposit with First Security Bank:
and account # 076 155 224 2866.

account # 076 999 264 0296

Respondent took the remaining

$20,000.
21.

Respondent paid some of the household expenses but

provided no funds for food or certain other expenses for the
family. Petitioner paid the monthly expenses that Respondent did
not pay from the First Security certificate of deposit accounts.
The remaining balance in account # 076 999 264 0296 is
$22,155.13.

The remaining balance in account # 076 155 224 2866

is $34,860.98.
-6-
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22.

The $60,000 savings was the joint property of the

Parties and should have been divided equally.

Therefore,

Petitioner should be required to pay Respondent $10,000 from
account # 076 999 264 0296 to compensate for the $20,000
difference in what Petitioner kept and what she gave to
Respondent.

The money in Petitioners' certificate of deposit

accounts has, since the initial division, remained the separate
property of Petitioner and has not been commingled with any of
Respondent's money.

Therefore, the remaining $12,155.13 in

account # 076 999 264 0296 as well as the $34,860.98 in account #
076 155 224 2866 should remain the sole and separate property of
Petitioner.
23.

The Parties have accumulated household furnishings

valued at approximately $25,000.00, which they should divide
equally among themselves with the items used primarily by the
children to remain with Petitioner in the family home for the
children's use.
24.

Respondent has $1,135.00 in his personal checking

account, which is a marital asset and should be awarded to him.
25.

Respondent has $1,322.00 in his money market account,

which is a marital asset and should be awarded to him.
-7-

26.

Respondent has $5,708.27 in his America First Credit

Union checking account, which is a marital asset and should be
awarded to should be awarded to him.
27.

Petitioner has $2,000.00 in her First Security Bank

savings account, which is a marital asset and should be awarded
to her.
28.

The Parties have a 50% interest in a boat valued at

$3,000.00.

The 50% interest, equal to $1,500.00, should be

awarded to Respondent.
29.

Respondent has a 1993 Toyota worth $9,000.00, which

should be awarded to him.

Respondent should also be responsible

for the $1,014.00 liability on the vehicle.
30.
Road.

The Parties have a family home located on 2988 Kempner

The Parties purchased the home in 1988 and have lived

there with their family for over ten years.

The majority of the

Parties' five minor children have never lived in any other home.
The family home has a fair market value of $380,000.00 and
liabilities of $58, 853(a mortgage of $41,853.00; property tax
liens of $4,000.00; and a personal loan from Petitioner's father
of $13,000.00).

The Parties' net equity in the family home is

$321,147.
-8-

31.

Petitioner should be awarded the family home and be

required to refinance the mortgage to enable her to pay
Respondent the sum of $100,000.

Petitioner should be responsible

for the mortgage on the home, the property tax liens and the
personal loan from Petitioner's father.

Petitioner should also

be responsible for obtaining Respondent's discharge from all
liabilities on the home.
32.

If Petitioner is not able to obtain a refinancing loan,

the issues relating to the division of marital property and
liabilities should be subject to review without a showing of a
change of circumstances.
33.

It is in the best interests of the children that

Petitioner be awarded the family home.

If Petitioner were

required to sell the family home, she would not be able to find
suitable housing for herself and the Parties' five minor children
with the net proceeds available.

Moreover, awarding Petitioner

the family home will cause the least amount of disruption to the
children's lives.
34.

Petitioner has $16,041.33 in her American Funds Group

IRA account, which should be awarded to her.
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35.

Respondent has $25,903.00 in his American Funds Group

IRA account, which should be awarded to him.
36.

Respondent has a $457.00 equity in his Southland

Insurance policy, which should be awarded to him.
37.

Respondent has a $5,608.00 equity in his Reliastar

Insurance policy, which should be awarded to him.
38.

Petitioner has credit card debt of $1,264.39, for which

she should be responsible.
39.

Respondent has credit card debt of $1,000.00, for which

he should be responsible.
40.

In 1997, Green Pointe Lawn, Inc. had a customer base of

312 customers.

In 1998, the company's customer base more than

doubled to 700 customers.

In 1997, Green Pointe Lawn, Inc. had

gross revenues of $45,498.87.

In 1998, the company's gross

revenues more than doubled to $119,323.52.

It is reasonable to

assume that Green Pointe Lawn Co., Inc. will continue to grow in
the future, although not at the same rate it has previously
experienced.

The Parties' 50% interest Green Pointe Lawn Care,

Inc., is currently worth not less than $35,800.00 and will likely
be worth more in the future.

Respondent objects to Petitioner

being awarded any interest in the business and the entire 50%
-10-

interest in Green Pointe Lawn, Inc. should be awarded to
Respondent.
41.

The Parties have five minor children they are entitled

to claim as dependents on their yearly tax returns.

The Parties

should each be awarded the right to claim half of the minor
children as dependents on their tax returns each year.

In years

where there are an odd number of minor children, the Parties
should be required to alternate yearly who is entitled to claim
the greater number of dependents.
42.

The Respondent has maintained and paid for health

insurance benefits for the Petitioner and the Parties' five minor
children through his employment.

The Respondent should be

required to maintain and pay for the same health insurance
benefits for the Parties' five children.

Petitioner should be

awarded the right to continue as an insured under the Defendant's
health and medical insurance policy in effect through his
employer, provided however, she shall be responsible for any
premium charges associated therewith.

In the event that the

health insurance benefits do not cover any of the medical
expenses of the Parties' five minor children, the Parties should
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be required to share equally the responsibility for those
expenses.
43.

Petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses total

$2,486.00.

Those expenses are more particularly set forth as

follows:
a.

Mortgage payment (prior to $100,000.00 second

mortgage - $626.00

44.

b.

House taxes - $160.00

c.

Homeowner's insurance - $50.00

d.

Utilities - $250.00

e.

Car taxes - $10.00

f.

Car insurance - $50.00

g.

Gas - $140.00

h.

Food - $800.00

i.

Clothes - $100.00

j.

Miscellaneous - $300.00

Respondent's reasonable monthly expenses total $949.

Those expenses are more particularly set forth as follows:
a.

Rent - $200

b.

Utilities - $40

c.

Telephone - $19
-12-

45.

d.

Medical and Dental - $40

e.

Car Payment - $155

f.

Car Insurance - $50

g.

Car Taxes - $40

h.

Gas - $150

i.

Food - $150

j.

Clothing - $40

k.

Laundry & Cleaning - $3 0

1.

Miscellaneous - $35

Based upon the calculations of the Child Support

Obligation Worksheet, Respondent is required to pay Petitioner
$1,069.00 per month in child support.
46.

Petitioner should be awarded $1,100.00 per month

permanent alimony for a period not to exceed the length of the
marriage or until terminated by operation of law.

Based upon

Petitioner's imputed income, Respondent's imputed income and both
Petitioner's and Respondent's reasonable expenses, alimony of
$1,100 per month is a reasonable amount.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

To the extent the foregoing Findings of Fact are also

Conclusions of Law, the same are adopted herein in all respects.
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2.

Each of the parties should be required to execute and

deliver to the other, such deeds, assignment, conveyances and
bills of sale as each may request from time to time with respect
to the assets awarded to the respective parties, including those
assets which the Court has found and determined to be separate
properties from the marital estate.
3.

Each of the parties should assume, pay, discharge and

hold the other harmless from any and all obligations after the
separation of the Parties.
4.

Each of the parties should bear the responsibility for

their individual costs and attorney's fees.
5.

The Decree of Divorce should be effective December 21,

1998.

Approved as to form:

David W. Steffensen
Attorney for Respondent

N: \l9497\l\PIND5eCON. WPD
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CAROLYN HAMMOND LINNELL,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Petitioner,
No. 974903252

vs.

Judge David S. Young

DENNIS D. LINNELL,
Respondent

The above-entitled case was tried before Judge David S.
Young on December 17, 18 and 21, 1998. Petitioner appeared
personally and was represented by and through counsel, Harold G.
Christensen and Heather S. White.

Respondent appeared personally

and was represented by and through counsel, Robert M. McDonald
and David W. Steffensen.

The Court heard evidence, received

exhibits and listened to the arguments of counsel.

Being fully

informed, having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact

and Conclusion of Law, and for good cause appearing, the Court
ORDERS as follows:

1.

Petitioner should be and hereby is awarded a divorce

from Respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences,
effective December 21, 1998;
2.

Petitioner should be and hereby is awarded sole

physical custody of the Parties' five minor children;
3.

The Parties should be and hereby are awarded joint

legal custody of the Parties' five minor children;
4.

Respondent should be and hereby is granted liberal but

reasonable rights of visitation with the Parties' five minor
children;
5.

Petitioner should be and hereby is awarded alimony in

the amount of $1,100.00 per month for a period not to exceed the
length of the marriage or until terminated by operation of law,
one-half payable on the fifth (5th) day of each month and the
remaining half payable on the twentieth (20th) day of each month,
commencing January 5, 1999;
6.

Petitioner should be and hereby is awarded $1,069.00

per month in child support, one-half payable on the fifth (5th)
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day of each month and the remaining half payable on the twentieth
(20th) day of each month, commencing January 5, 1999;
7.

Petitioner should be and hereby is awarded as her sole

and separate property, without claim from Respondent, the
following:
a.

Petitioner's First Security Bank savings account

worth $2,000;
b.

$12,155.13 of Petitioner's First Security Bank

certificate of deposit, account # 076 999 264 0296;
c.

Petitioner's First Security Bank certificate of

deposit, account # 076 155 224 2866, worth $34,860.98;
d.

The family home located on 2988 Kempner Road

having a fair market value of $380,000;
e.

Petitioner's American Funds Group IRA account

worth $16,041.33;
8.

Petitioner should be and hereby is responsible for the

following liabilities:
a.

The mortgage on the family home;

b.

Property tax liens on the home in the amount of

$4,000;
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c*

A personal loan from Petitioner's father on the

family home in the amount of $13,000;
d.
9.

Petitioner's credit card debt of $1,264.39;

Respondent should be and hereby is awarded as his sole

and separate property, without claim from Petitioner, the
following:
a.

$10,000 from Petitioner's First Security Bank

certificate of deposit, account # 076 999 264 0296;
b.

Respondent's personal checking account worth

c.

Respondent's money market account worth $1,322;

d.

Respondent's America First Credit Union checking

$1,135;

account worth $5,70 8.27;
e.

$10,000 of Petitioner's First Security Bank

certificate of deposit, account # 076 999 264 0296;
f.

The Parties' 50% interest in a boat, worth $1,500;

g.

1993 Toyota worth $9,000;

h.

Respondent's American Funds Group IRA account

worth $25,903;
i.

Respondent's $457 equity in his Southland

Insurance policy;

j.

Respondent's $5,608 equity in his Reliastar

Insurance policy;
k.

Respondent's entire 50% interest in Green Pointe

Lawn Care, Inc. presently worth not less than $35,800;
10.

Respondent should be and hereby is responsible for the

following liabilities:
a.

Liability on the 1993 Toyota in the amount of

b.

Respondent's credit card debt of $1,000;

$1,014;

11.

The Parties should be and hereby are required to divide

equally the $25,000 worth of household furnishings they have
acquired during the marriage with the items used primarily by the
children to remain with Petitioner in the family home for the
children's use;
12.

The Parties should be and hereby are awarded the right

to claim half of the minor children as dependents on their tax
returns each year.

In years where there are an odd number of

minor children, the Parties are required to alternate yearly who
is entitled to claim the greater number of dependents, beginning
with Petitioner for the tax year 1998;
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13.

The Respondent should be and hereby is required to

maintain and pay for the same health insurance benefits for the
Parties' five children that the Respondent has previously
maintained through his employment.

Petitioner should be and

hereby is awarded the right to continue as an insured under the
Defendant's health and medical insurance policy in effect through
his employer, provided however, she shall be responsible for any
premium charges associated therewith.

In the event that the

health insurance benefits do not cover any of the medical
expenses of the Parties' five minor children, the Parties should
be and hereby are required to share equally the responsibility
for those expenses;
14.

Petitioner should be and hereby is required to

refinance the family home, pay Respondent the sum of $100,000 and
discharge Respondent from all liabilities on the family home;
15.

If Petitioner is not able to obtain a refinancing loan,

the issues relating to the division of marital property and
liabilities shall be subject to review without a showing of a
change of circumstances;
16.

The Parties should be and hereby are required to pay

their own costs and attorney's fees.
6

DATED this *lp

day of J&BT 1999.
BY THE COURT:

DAVID S. Yi
District C
Approved as to form:

David W. Steffensen
Attorney for Respondent

N \19497\1\DIVDBCRE WPD
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Gloriann Egan, says that she is employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen &
Martineau, attorneys for Petitioner Carolyn Hammond Linnell; that she served the attached
DECREE OF DIVORCE (Case Number 974903252, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah) upon the party listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in
an envelope addressed to:
David W. Steffensen
Steffensen McDonald Steffensen
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
SaJt Lake City, Utah 84106

and causing the same to be hand delivered on the *- ' day of April, 1999.
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ROBERT M. MCDONALD, P.C. (A2175)
DAVID W. STEFFENSEN, P.C. (A4677)
STEFFENSEN MCDONALD STEFFENSEN
Attorneys for Respondent
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 485-1818

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CAROLYN HAMMOND LINNELL
Petitioner,

MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DECREE
OF DIVORCE

v.
DENNIS D. LINNELL
Respondent.

Case No. 974903252
Judge David S. Young

Pursuant to Rules 52 and 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Respondent Dennis D.
Linnell respectfully moves the Court to amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce entered by the Court on May 20, 1999. More particularly, Respondent moves
the Court as follows:
a.

Respondent moves to amend Findings of Fact Nos. 12,13,16,17,20-22,
31,33,40,42,45,46;

b.

Respondent moves to amend Conclusions of Law No. 1 to the extent the
Findings constitute conclusions of law;

c.

Respondent moves the Court to amend the Decree of Divorce dated on or

about May 20,1999 and /or direct the entry of a new Decree of Divorce
consistent with the amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
legal authorities cited in the Memorandum in support of this Motion; and
d.

In the alternative, to the extent necessary to bring the matter to a just
conclusion, Respondent moves the Court for a new trial and an Order
opening the Decree of Divorce and, to the extent the Court deems
necessary take additional evidence and/or testimony and direct entry of a
new Decree of Divorce.

The grounds for the Motion are as follows: (a) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Divorce Decree; (b) the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Divorce Decree are against law; (c) the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Divorce Decree constitute an error in law.
This Motion is supported by a Motion of even date.
DATED this _ 2 > day of May, 1999.
DAVID W. STEFFENASEN, P.C.

D a W w . Steffensen
Attorney for Respon

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the P day of June, 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce, and
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, to be mailed, postage prepaid, and
addressed to the following:
Harold G. Christensen
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DATED this J

day of June, 1999.

ROBERT M. MCDONALD, P.C. (A2175)
DAVID W. STEFFENSEN, P.C. (A4677)
STEFFENSEN MCDONALD STEFFENSEN
Attorneys for Respondent
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 485-1818
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CAROLYN HAMMOND LINNELL,
Petitioner,
vs.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO AMEND
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND DECREE OF DIVORCE

DENNIS D. LINNELL,
Respondent.

Case No. 974903252
Judge David S. Young

Respondent Dennis D. Linnell submits this memorandum in support of Respondent's Motion to
Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This case was tried before the Honorable David S. Young on December 17, 18, and 21, 1998.
Pursuant to the Court's instruction, Petitioner submitted to Respondent's counsel proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce.

2.

Because Respondent's counsel had objections to the proposed findings and decree, on February
16, 1999, Respondent filed his Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, and Objection to Form of Proposed Decree of Divorce, and Memorandum in Support

thereof. Petitioner filed her Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Objection on March
1, 1999.
The Court heard oral argument on Respondent's Objection on April 16,1999 and made rulings
that were incorporated into the final version of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce that were entered by the Court on May 20, 1999.
The present motion focuses on findings of fact entered by the Court that are not supported by
the evidence, are in error, or are against applicable law. The present motion seeks amendment
of the following findings of fact.
Finding No. 12. The amount of cash found to be available for distribution in Finding No. 12
is wrong. For the purpose of imputing income to Respondent, the finding states: "As of
December 17, 1998, the company had cash available for distribution to the owners in the
amount of $38,246.10. Respondent's half interest is $19,123.05. Based upon those figures,
Respondent could have received gross income of $33,350.36, or $2,779,20 per month, in
1998." That statement is not supported by the evidence at trial; Green Pointe's cash on hand
as of the trial date was $36,085.44, and not $38,246.10. The $36,085.44 number reflects Green
Pointe's uncollected accounts receivable which may not even be collectable. The undisputed
testimony of the Respondent and his CPA expert was that the $36,085.44 in company cash was
not available for distribution, but rather was needed to pay the company's approximately
$9,000 per month in expenditures to keep the company operating in its "down" months, to hire
a new worker, and to buy another truck to facilitate the company's growth. In this regard, the
Court seems to rely on the assumption that the company is going to continue growing, yet the
Court found that the company's cash, which was needed to fund an additional truck and
employee to facilitate that growth, should not be applied to that purpose but should be
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distributed to the shareholders instead. Either the company grows and has no cash available
for distribution, or the company has cash available for distribution and does not grow. It cannot
be both ways.
6.

Finding No. 13. Finding No. 13 finds that "Respondent is currently not earning the amount
of income he has historically earned or is capable of earning," and finds that "Respondent is
voluntarily underemployed and that income in the amount of $40,000.00 per year should be
imputed to him." That finding is contrary to the undisputed evidence at trial. Pertinent material
facts established at trial are as follows: a) that Respondent was gainfully employed on a fulltime basis for Green Pointe, a lawncare start-up company, in work which constituted his
historical highest and best use; b) Green Pointe was formed by Respondent and his 50%
partner, Steve Nicholaides, long before the parties separated or Petitioner filed for divorce; c)
Respondent started Green Pointe only after discussing the startup with Petitioner and obtaining
her support for his doing so. Respondent's purpose in starting Green Pointe was to do what
was in the best long term economic interest of his family taking into consideration his lack of
any schooling beyond high school, lack of meaningful experience in any job or industry other
than lawn care, and substantial experience and success in building and running a lawn care
company in the past; and d) despite Respondent's and Mr. Nicholaides' full time efforts in
building the business of Green Pointe, the business of Green Pointe was not sufficiently
developed or established to pay Respondent or Mr. Nicholaides any income between the
company's start date in February of 1997 and May of 1998, when Green Pointe first had
sufficient revenues to fund salary payments to those gentlemen. From May 1998 and
continuing until the date of trial, Green Pointe paid Respondent and Mr. Nicholaides salaries
that Green Pointe's business volume and cash flow could afford, approximately $14,000 each
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(approximately $1,500 per month each). Notwithstanding Green Pointe's paying no salaries
to Respondent and Mr. Nicholaides in 1997, Green Pointe suffered a net loss reported on the
company's tax return of $4,495. With paying salaries of approximately $14,000 each to
Respondent and Mr. Nicholaides in 1998, Green Pointe suffered a net loss through the date of
trial of $1,146.35. While Petitioner's earnings capability expert testified that Respondent could
find a management job for a lawn care company in Utah that would pay between $30,000 and
$50,000 within a "reasonable time," that expert's own definition of "a reasonable time,"
namely, "sometime within the next two years," suggests that any imputation of income would
have to be discounted below the $30,000 range given for the time delay in getting a job. For
the Court to impute income at $40,000 anyway, is not supported by the clear implication of the
testimony of Petitioner's own expert that he was aware of no such jobs being currently
available in Utah and it could take Respondent two years to find such a job earning between
$30,000 and $50,000.l With no such jobs currently available as of the time of trial, the mere
prospect of getting such a job sometime in the next two years simply does not support a current
imputation of $40,000 per year. If the Court is still inclined to impute income to Respondent,
it should do so at the level established by Respondent's expert, namely $24,800 (note, the
income range established by expert testimony was $24,800 to $30,300).
7.

Finding No. 16. Finding No. 16 is in error because the income level imputed to Petitioner

1

Petitioner's expert testified that he could not name any lawn care company in the State
of Utah, that he had talked to no lawn care company in the state of Utah, and had no idea whether
or not any such jobs were actually available in the State of Utah at the $30,000 to $50,000
income level he testified could be earned. Importantly, Respondent's earnings expert's report
contained actual employment data for Utah jobs showing that no lawn care industry management
jobs were available in Utah at the time of trial and, further, that if such a job were currently
available, the actual Utah employment data showed the annual income range for such jobs was
$15,600 to $27,700, with the median income being $24,800.
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should be at least the minimum amount established by the unrefuted testimony of Respondent's earnings expert—namely $13,520 (the income range established by expert testimony
was $13,520 to $18,720 for work immediately available with no upgrades in work skills). In
light of the fact that Petitioner presented no evidence to rebut the testimony of Respondent's
expert, finding that Petitioner "is only qualified to earn minimum wage" is unsupported by the
evidence and in error.
Finding No. 17. Finding No. 17 is in error for the same reasons that Finding No. 16 is in
error. With a correct imputation amount, the total amount of income imputed should be no less
than $17,420.
Finding Nos. 20-22. Findings Nos. 20 through 22 are in error because they imply that the
$10,000 payment from Petitioner to Respondent "equalizes" the division of the parties'
$65,000 in cash assets. In this regard, the evidence at trial was: a) that in October 1994,
Petitioner took most of the cash, ($40,000 of the $65,000); b) after Petitioner took most of the
cash, she only paid for family food and gas for her car, thus expending only small portions of
those monies, while Respondent paid virtually all of the family's expenses with the $25,000
that was not taken; c) the result of the disparate spending was that by the time of the trial of
this matter, Petitioner had almost $57,000 left in cash ($22,155.13 plus $34,860.98) whereas
Respondent had only $7,000 left in cash (the $1,322 in his money market account and the
$5,708.27 in his America First Credit Union checking account). In "equalizing" that cash, what
the Court should do is divide the cash on the basis of ending cash balances as of the time of
trial on December 21, 1998, and not as of October 1994. The Court divided the cash as of
October 1994 based solely upon Petitioner's self serving statement (which was disputed by
Respondent) that Petitioner was contemplating a divorce in October 1994. Yet Petitioner did
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not file for divorce until July 31, 1997, and the parties did not separate until approximately
November of 1997. From October 1994 through November 1997 and continuing until the time
of trial, Respondent used the $25,000 in marital cash assets in his accounts to support the
family (thus reducing the balance thereof to $7,000 at the time of trial) whereas Petitioner
essentially saved all of her marital cash (thus leaving almost $57,000 in her accounts at the
time of trial).
Finding No. 31. Finding No. 31 is in error because it states that only $100,000 in the equity
of the Parties' home on 2988 Kempner Road need be paid to Respondent by Petitioner out of
a refinancing by Petitioner on the home because a $100,000 cash payment, when combined
with the overall division and distribution of the parties' marital assets, does not fairly or
equitably divide the parties' marital assets. In this regard, the $100,000 payment was the "plug"
number the Court determined was necessary to render the overall property division equitable.
With the $100,000 payment, the division of assets found by the Court in fact is not equitable,
but rather results in $312,440 being awarded to Petitioner and $191,919 being awarded to
Respondent (See attached "Exhibit 1" Property Division Summary). As sole support for
finding that this grossly unequal division of the parties' marital assets is "equitable," the Court
expressed its opinion that Respondent would be able to bring about the future growth of Green
Pointe to make up the difference. Reliance upon the future growth of is an erroneous basis for
rendering an otherwise unequal property division equitable.
Finding 33. Finding No. 33 finds that it is in the best interests of the children that Petitioner
be awarded the family home and that Petitioner, if required to sell the family home, would not
be able to find suitable housing for herself and the Parties' five minor children with the net
proceeds available. This finding is in error because Respondent's real estate expert, Veda
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Barrie, was prepared to testify to the existence of numerous homes in the immediate
neighborhood that Petitioner could buy with her share of the net proceeds from the sale of the
parties' home, which would involve the children going to all of the same schools. Hence, there
would be no disruption to the children whatsoever. When the Court ruled that all such
testimony was irrelevant, Respondent made a proffer of what his real estate expert's testimony
would be. The Court erred in not allowing that testimony, and it erred in finding that Petitioner
would not be able to find suitable housing for herself and the Parties' children with the net
proceeds. Moreover, the finding ignores the economic reality established at trial that the parties
cannot afford to allow Respondent an acceptable standard of living and also keep Petitioner
in the parties' $380,000 home. The undisputed testimony at trial was that the financial stresses
resulting from Respondent's being forced to bear financial obligations beyond his means to
keep the children in the family home would far outweigh the non-disruption benefit to the
children in staying in the home. Accordingly, the finding is not supported by the evidence and
its entry, in the face of the Court's refusal to hear and consider the proffered testimony of
Respondent's real estate expert, is in error.
Finding No. 40. Finding No. 40 is in error because the Court focused upon and emphasized
the dramatic growth in the business volume of Green Pointe and found that Green Pointe "will
continue to grow in the future." It is obvious from the unequal nature of the Court's division
of the parties' marital assets combined with the Court's conclusion that such property division
is "equitable," that the Court is relying on the future growth of the Green Pointe business
interest to make the parties' asset division equitable (The Court's finding that the value of the
Green Pointe business interest is worth not less than $35,800.00 and will likely be worth more
in the future," underlines Respondent's point.). For the same reasons that Finding No. 31 is in
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error, Finding No. 40 is in error.
13.

Finding No. 42. Finding No. 42 is in error because it did not hold that each parent is to share
equally in the out-of-pocket costs of health insurance premiums. Rather, the finding
erroneously holds that "[tjhe Respondent should be required to maintain and pay for the same
health insurance benefits for the Parties' five children."

14. Finding No. 45. Finding No. 45 is in error because the income imputed to respondent was
in error; therefore, the child support, calculated using that imputed income, is necessarily
excessive and wrong.
15.

Finding No. 46. Finding No. 46 is in error because the Court incorrectly calculated alimony
to be awarded to Petitioner.

ARGUMENT
I. Introduction.
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides a basis for a party to request that the court
amend its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce. Rule 59(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in conjunction with Rule 52. a basis for a party to move the Court
for a new trial and open the judgment in the event of "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law," or is an "error in law." The evidence discussed
above provides ample basis for amending the Findings. Moreover, there is insufficient evidence to
justify the Court's rulings, and such rulings are contrary to Utah law. Therefore, the Court should
amend its findings, or grant Respondent a new trial.

II. Finding No. 12.
Respondent moves to amend Finding No. 12 on the ground that, as discussed above in paragraph 5
above, the amount of cash stated to be available is factually incorrect and such cash is not available
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for distribution under Utah law. Under Utah law, the company cash could not be "available" for
distribution to its shareholders at the time of trial. With the undisputed testimony that Green Pointe
had liabilities in excess of assets as of the time of trial (see Green Pointe Balance Sheet introduced
into evidence at trial), Green Pointe's cash could not be available for distribution under Utah Code
Ann. §12-10a-640(3), which states that "no distribution [to shareholders] may be made if, after
giving it effect: (a) the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual
course of business; or (b) the corporation's total assets would be less than the sum of its total
liabilities...." A distribution of the $36,085.44 in Green Pointe's cash to its shareholders at the time
of trial would, under that section and §§16-10a-840 and 16-10a-841 be an "unlawful distribution"
for which the directors participating in such distribution could be personally surcharged. If the
distribution would be illegal under applicable Utah law, which on the present facts, it would be, then
Green Pointe's cash cannot, as a matter of law, be "available" for distribution in such a way that it
can be added to Respondent's income in an effort to support income imputation.2
III. Finding No. 13.
Respondent moves to amend Finding No. 13 on the ground that it is not supported by the evidence

2

The purpose of the statutory rule is to ensure that a corporation makes no distributions
of assets to shareholders without first assuring that the corporation has sufficient assets for the
payment of its creditors. That statutory provision protects against the use of corporate shells for
perpetrating fraud on persons that do business with corporations. It should be noted in this regard
that in January of 1999, Green Pointe, in response to heavy pressure and a threat of litigation
from Herald Hammond, the Petitioner's father and a creditor of Green Pointe, paid Mr.
Hammond $25,000 of Green Pointe's $36,000 cash on hand to reduce his loan to the company
from $48,000 to $23,000, and Green Pointe executed and delivered to Mr. Hammond a
promissory note for the $23,000 balance payable with interest over the next five years. If Green
Pointe would have distributed its $36,000 in cash to its shareholders, then Green Pointe would
not have had sufficient funds to pay Mr. Hammond. If Green Pointe had in fact distributed the
$36,000 to its shareholders as the Court implied Green Pointe was able to do, and if Green Pointe
had immediately thereafter ceased doing business, Mr. Hammond and the other creditors of
Green Pointe would have been left holding an empty bag.
9

at trial and is an error in law. As discussed above in paragraph 6 above, the evidence introduced at
trial does not support the income imputed to the Respondent. Income imputation on such facts is
clearly inappropriate under Utah law. In Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015 (Utah App. 1998), the
Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to impute a husband's historic side-job
income where, "(1) husband had stopped performing the side-jobs before the couple separated and
was unlikely to perform them again in the future; (2) husband worked fifty hours a week at a
demanding job, and thus was not underemployed, (3) [the family business] appropriately
compensated husband for full time work; and (4) husband's extra work was done to keep the family
business viable and thus was not evidence of voluntary underemployment." Id. at 1018 (emphasis
added). That ruling was consistent with "the goal of imputing income," which "is to prevent parents
from reducing their child support or alimony by purposeful unemployment or underemployment."
Id.
As in Griffith, Respondent's change in work and income status in no way is a purposeful
attempt to reduce his child support or alimony obligations. Indeed, the undisputed evidence at trial
was that Mr. Linnell started his current full-time job at Green Pointe long before the parties'
separation and Petitioner filed for divorce. To impute income to the Respondent, the Court would
have to find that Respondent expended a great deal of effort and money starting Green Pointe for the
express purpose of avoiding child support and alimony. That was not the evidence at trial, however.
Rather, the undisputed evidence at trial was that Respondent, having lost his job at Lawnlife and also
his only substantial consulting client thereafter, sought to do what would be in the best long term
interests of his family—that is, start and build a lawn care company that he could control and which
would never terminate him. Such facts, when viewed in light of Griffith, preclude any income
imputation. Accordingly, the Court's finding that income should be imputed to Respondent is against
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applicable law and an error in law.
Moreover, even if the Court could impute income to Respondent, which under applicable Utah
law the Court can not, the amount of income imputed to Respondent is not supported by the evidence
at trial. First, as stated above, the Court's finding that Green Pointe's $36,085.44 in cash on hand as
of the date of trial was available for distribution to its shareholders and, thus, was a basis for
supporting income imputation of $40,000 to Respondent, is factually and legally in error. Without
the Green Pointe cash being available for distribution, it becomes clear that the only monies available
to Respondent through Green Pointe was the salary Green Pointe could afford and the salary he was
being paid, which was $14,000 from May of 1998 through the date of trial ($1,500 per month).

IV. Finding No. 16.
As discussed in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, Respondent moves to amend Findings Nos. 16 and 17
because the income level to be imputed to Petitioner should be at least the minimum amount
established by the unrefuted testimony of Respondent's earnings expert, namely $13,520, and more
properly should be $17,420. The Court's finding that Petitioner "is only qualified to earn minimum
wage" is unsupported by any evidence whatsoever, is contradicted by unrefuted evidence, and is a
factual error.

V. Finding Nos. 20-22.
As discussed above in paragraph 9, Respondent moves to amend findings 20-22 to the extent that
they imply that the $10,000 payment from Petitioner to Respondent "equalizes" the division of the
parties' $65,000 in cash assets. The appropriate date for evaluating and dividing marital assets is
the time of trial Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P. 2d 260,262 (Utah App. 1993); accord Dunn v. Dunn,
801 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1990); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-23 (Utah 1980); Peck v. Peck,
738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App. 1987), and not four years earlier when one or the other parties first
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"contemplates" getting a divorce. Although trial courts have discretion to use a different date, if
court uses a date other than the date of trial, it must support its decision with sufficiently detailed
findings of fact explaining its deviation from the general rule. Shepherd v. Spepherd, 876 P.2d 429,
433 (Utah App. 1994), citing Rappleye, supra at 262; Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050,1052 (Utah App.
1987).
In light of the case law, the Court erred in evaluating and dividing the cash as of October 1994.
First, the Court evaluated and divided all other property as of the time of trial and only divided the
parties' cash assets as of October 1994. Only one date can be used for the division of all assets. The
Court's use of differing valuation dates results in an allocation of more assets to Petitioner than
would be allocated to her if a consistent valuation date were employed. Second, the Court made no
findings of fact in support of its deviation from the general rule (except to acknowledge Petitioner's
self serving statement, disputed by Respondent at trial that she "contemplated getting a divorce" in
1994, and each of the parties had use of their separated cash assets thereafter). If the cash were
divided as Utah law requires, the total cash on hand at the time of trial of $67,181.38 would be
divided equally between the parties so that the additional cash payment from Petitioner to
Respondent would increase from $10,000 to $25,425.42.
VI. Finding No. 31.
Respondent moves to amend Finding No. 31 on the grounds that the division of assets is not
equitable, but rather results in $312,440 being awarded to Petitioner and $191,919 being awarded
to Respondent. See Property Division Summary attached hereto as "Exhibit 1." The overriding
consideration in property division is "that the ultimate division be equitable—that property be fairly
divided between the parties given their contributions during the marriage and their circumstances
at the time of the divorce." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1322 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Burt v.
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Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,1171 (Utah App. 1990); see also Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276,1278
(Utah 1987)). In Dunn, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court abused its discretion when it
justified an unequal and inequitable distribution of marital property (24% to wife and 76% to
husband) solely on the parties' economic contributions to the marriage. The Appellate Court then
stated:
On remand, the trial court should follow the systematic approach set forth in Burt. That is, the
court should first properly categorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the
separate property of one or the other as set forth in this opinion. Each party is then presumed
to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property.
Burt, 799 P.2d at 1171; Maxwell v. Maxwell, 745 P.2d 84, 86-87 (Utah App. 1990) (absent
special circumstances, property accumulated by the parties during the marriage should be
equally divided). Id. at 1323.
In the case at hand, the only special circumstance the Court referred to as justification for
finding the grossly unequal division of the parties' marital assets to be "equitable," is that the Court
thought that Respondent would be able to bring about the future growth of Green Pointe to make up
the difference, notwithstanding the undisputed testimony at trial was that it would take three to five
years for Green Pointe to have a sufficient business volume to pay to Respondent the $40,000
income imputed to Respondent. The Court's reliance upon the future earnings potential and future
value of Green Pointe is an inappropriate basis for rendering an otherwise unequal property division
equitable, especially when the growth of that business interest is wholly dependent upon the future
personal work and personal efforts of Respondent. See Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 844
(Utah App. 1992).
VII. Finding No. 33.
Respondent moves the Court to amend Finding No. 33 because it erroneously finds that it is in the
best interests of the children that Petitioner be awarded the family home and that Petitioner, if
required to sell the family home, would not be able to find suitable housing for herself and the
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Parties' five minor children with the net proceeds available. This finding is in error for two reasons:
1) as indicated by Respondent's proffer of testimony of his real estate expert, there are numerous
homes in the immediate neighborhood that Petitioner could buy with her share of the proceeds from
the sale of the home, and the children would experience minimal disruption because they would
attend the same schools and live in the same neighborhood close to their friends. Simply put, it was
error to exclude such proffered testimony, especially when the Court went on to find that Petitioner
would not be able to find suitable housing for herself and the Parties' children with the net proceeds;
and 2) the finding ignores the fact that the parties cannot afford to keep Petitioner in the home and
also provide Respondent with an acceptable standard of living. Accordingly, the finding is not
supported by the evidence and its entry, in the face of the Court's refusal to hear and consider the
proffered testimony of Respondent's real estate expert, is in error.

VII. Finding No. 40.
Finding No. 40 is in error for several reasons. First, the Court is relying on the future growth of
Green Pointe to make the asset division equitable. For the reasons set forth in Section VI. above, the
finding is contrary to Utah law and is in error. Second, in relying on the earnings of Green Pointe,
which is essentially a personal service business, the Court erroneously doubled Respondent's
earnings potential. In Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court held
that the good will of a professional sole practitioner, which essentially is comprised of his or her
future earnings potential, is not a marital asset subject to division. Id. at 776-77'. In so holding, the
Court stated:
The combination of the degree and the practitioner's reputation enables him or her to
earn in many cases a substantial income, the fruits of which are shared by the children
in the form of child support and by the former spouse in the form of alimony. That is true
in the instant case where defendant has been ordered to pay substantial amounts of child
support and alimony which were determined in light of his earnings from his dental
practice. Requiring defendant to divide with his wife the value of his reputation would
14

not be an "equitable division," which is required by our statute, but would constitute
"double counting," which is condemned in property division cases.
Id. While Respondent admittedly is not a professional, Green Pointe is a personal service business
which is solely reliant upon Respondent's and his partner's personal services. When the Court
awarded Petitioner alimony based upon an income level of $40,000 imputed to Respondent due to
the Court's view of the cash available in Green Pointe and Green Pointe's earnings capacity, and
then valued Respondent's Vi interest in Green Pointe at $35,800 based upon Green Pointe's earnings
potential (using the formula of 70% of gross sales), the Court double counted Respondent's earnings
capability in violation of the principles enumerated in Sorensen. Under the principles set forth in
Sorensen, no value should be ascribed to the Green Pointe business interest. Accordingly, the finding
is in error and against Utah law.

VIII. Finding No. 42.
Finding No. 42 finds that: 4The Respondent should be required to maintain and pay for the same
health insurance benefits for the Parties' five children." This finding is in error because Utah Code
Ann. §78-45-7.15(3) provides that "the order shall require each parent to share equally the out-ofpocket costs of the premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance."

IX. Finding No. 45.
As discussed above, the income imputed to Respondent is inappropriate. Therefore, the child support
payment, which is calculated using the income imputed to Respondent, is necessarily excessive and
wrong.

X. Finding No. 46.
Finding No. 46 is in error because the method of calculating alimony, and the resultant alimony
award, violate Utah law regarding the establishment of alimony. The factors to be taken into
consideration in establishing alimony are set forth at Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7). In Morgan v.
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Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 567 (Utah App,), the Utah Court of Appeals reviewed such factors, stating:
In awarding alimony, appellate courts require the trial court to consider each of the
following three factors: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse;
(2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for him or herself;
and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support, [citations omitted]
Applied to the instant case, the Court violated the second Morgan factor when it stated that income
at minimum wage was imputed to Petitioner solely for purposes of calculating child support and was
not considered in calculating alimony. The Court cannot impute income to Petitioner for child
support purposes but not for alimony purposes. If income is imputed to Petitioner, the imputed
income should apply to both child support and alimony. When properly taking the Petitioner's
imputed and actual income into consideration in calculating the alimony obligation as is required
under the cases cited above, the alimony award should only be $167 per month.
Moreover, the Court violated the third Morgan factor by not considering Respondent's
reasonable living expenses when the Court determined Respondent's ability to pay such alimony.
Even under the $40,000.00 imputed to the Respondent, he could not afford to pay such support
(because $40,000/12 = $3,333 per month, less child support of $1,069, less alimony of $1,100 leaves
only $1,164 per month before any payroll and income taxes are withheld, leaving an amount, after
payment of required taxes, of less than $949.00 per month to pay Respondent's necessary living
expenses). In other words, at the $40,000 income level imputed to Respondent by the Court,
Respondent is unable to provide the ordered support. Furthermore, the $40,000 imputed income is
a fiction. Respondent's actual income is only $1,500 per month. Thus, the $2,169 per month in
alimony and child support payments exceed Respondent's actual income by $669 per month.
The inequitable property division heavily skewed in favor of Petitioner, combined with the
award to Petitioner of alimony and child support in an amount exceeding Respondent's income
award, is patently unfair and unjust. The effect is to force Respondent to liquidate his share of the
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property division to fund the excessive alimony and child support obligations. This violates the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7) in that the Court should have exercised its authority in
equity to equalize the parties' respective standards of living, rather than impose an alimony award
that exacerbates and increases an already unequal standard of living.

XI. Proposed Amendments to Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce.
To the extent the foregoing Findings of Fact constitute conclusions of law under Rules 52 and 59(a)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the Respondent can and does move the Court to amend the
findings for the reasons set forth above. To the extent the Findings of Fact are embodied in the
Decree, under Rules 52 and 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Respondent can and does
move the Court to amend the Decree and/or direct the entry of a new Decree consistent with the
amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and legal authorities cited above. The
Respondent also moves the Court for a new trial and an Order opening the Decree for the purpose
of considering additional evidence and direct entry of a new decree.

CONCLUSION
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce discussed above are in error.
Therefore, the Court should amend the Findings and Decree, or grant Respondent a new trial.
DATED this Z5""dav of June, 1999.
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Exhibit 1
PROPERTY DIVISION SUMMARY
ASSET

VALUE

PETITIONER

2,000.00
1,135.00

2,000.00

Carolyn's Account
Carolyn's Account
Denny's Account
Denny's Account

22,155.13
34,860.98
1,322.00
5,708.27

22,155.13
34,860.98
1,322.00

Furniture

25,000.00

17,500.003

V6 of Boat

1,500.00

1,500.00

Toyota Truck
Toyota Truck Loan

9,000.00
(1,014.00)

9,000.00
(1,014.00)

Home Equity

321,147.00

221,147.00

IRA

16,041.33

16,041.33

IRA

25,903.00

25,903.00

Southland
Reliastar
Carolyn CC Debt
Denny CC Debt

457.00
5,608.00
(1,264.39)
(1,000.00)

457.00
5,608.00

Totals:

504,359.32

RESPONDENT

Cash:
Carolyn Checking
Denny Checking

1,135.00

The Remainder of $65,000:

5,708.27
7,500.00

100,000.00

(1,264.39)
(1,000.00)
312,440.05

3

191,919.27

Not equal because the furnishings relating to the support of the children were ordered to
stay in the marital home.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
day ofJvne, 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid, and addressed to the following:
Harold G. Christensen
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DATED this 2% day of June, 1999.
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HEARING
The Court has reviewed Respondent's Motion to Amend Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce and Denis the same,
This signed minute entry shall serve as the Order of the Court,
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